Welltower Inc.

WELL Real Estate · REIT - Healthcare Facilities
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$234.63
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$171.25 — $255.20
-8% from high
Market cap
169.1B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
1.4%
P/E
104.3
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Oct 16, 2026

Fairly valued.

Revenue jumped 40.2% in 2025 while net income slipped, and debt rose sharply.

Neutral Beneish: -3.05Piotroski: 5/9
RED DEEP 74 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Beneish M Earnings manipulation
-3.05
Clean
−3.0 threshold −1.78 +1.0
Piotroski F Fundamental health (0–9)
5
Mixed
0 threshold 6+ 9
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

The forensic screens point in different directions and do not settle the question. The Beneish M-Score is -3.050, below the -1.78 threshold, so it is not in the elevated manipulation-risk zone. An elevated score would be a screening flag calling for a closer read; this result does not trigger that flag, though a screen is not proof either way. The Piotroski F-Score is 5 of 6 computable signals, meaning five of the six signals that could be computed passed the standard checklist of profitability, leverage and efficiency tests. Operating cash flow to net income is 3.00, meaning 2025 operating cash flow of $2.88 billion was about three times reported net income of $961.84 million. For a real estate investment trust, a gap like this is common because depreciation is a large non-cash charge that reduces net income but not cash, so readers may want to look at the cash flow statement and depreciation line to confirm. The Altman Z″-Score and Fog Index are not on file, so no value is given for either. Beyond the scores, the filings describe a large and growing footprint: over 2,500 properties, 712 employees as of December 31, 2025, and operations in the U.S., U.K. and Canada. The 10-Q's Part II describes a $3.0 billion Stock Repurchase Program under which no shares were repurchased in the first quarter of 2026; the 58,931 shares acquired in that quarter were employee tax-withholding transactions, not program buybacks. The company also redeemed 332,081 OP Units for common shares during the quarter. Readers may want to look at how the rising debt level of $19.2 billion, and the indemnification exposure described in the legal proceedings section, interact with the company's cash generation as future filings are released.

Catalyst.The filings show strong top-line expansion. Revenues rose to $8.45 billion in 2025 from $6.03 billion in 2024, a 40.2% year-over-year increase per the provided data. The 10-K describes a data science platform built on a portfolio of over 2,500 properties, used in underwriting and capital expenditure decisions, and an operating platform called WBS intended to standardize operations across its seniors housing operating partner network. In the Q1 2026 10-Q, the company disclosed an Amended and Restated Credit Agreement dated March 6, 2026, with KeyBank National Association as administrative agent covering Revolving A and Revolving B facilities. The MD&A excerpt provided does not include the results discussion, so the specific drivers behind the revenue increase are not confirmed here.

Hidden risk.The most easily missed tension is between revenue growth and earnings. Net income was $961.84 million in 2025, compared with $972.86 million in 2024, a slight decline even as revenue grew 40.2%. Long-term debt rose to $19.2 billion at year-end 2025 from $15.5 billion a year earlier, an increase of about 24%. The 10-Q legal proceedings section warns that some tenants and operators who must indemnify the company may not have sufficient insurance, assets, income or resources to meet those obligations, which could materially affect the company. The 10-Q also states there were no material changes to the 10-K risk factors, so readers may want to check the 10-K risk section directly for detail on these exposures.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what WELL reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
2.8%
of the shares available to trade
Low
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
17.7M
Change since Aug 31
−3.7%
Days to cover
6.4

What it tells us

Few traders are betting against WELL. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.

Little changed since the Aug 31 report (−3.7%).

Short sellers would need about 6.4 days of normal trading to buy back every borrowed share. A slow exit like that can make a rush to cover sharper.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement

The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Welltower filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Jul 28, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 28, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 8.01: Other events0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 27, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 13, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 8.01: Other events0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 29, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-03-31)Period: 2026-03-310
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 29, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-04-29)Item 8.01: Other events0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 28, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-04-28)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 10, 2026
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2026-05-21)0
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 10, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-03-06)Item 1.01: Signed a material agreement0
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 12, 2026
    10-K
    Annual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

If this case caught your eye

Affiliate links — Filing.fyi earns a commission on Amazon purchases. We pick the books first, attach the link second.

Financial Shenanigans

Howard M. Schilit

Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.

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The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

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Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

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