Bristol-Myers Squibb Company

BMY Healthcare · Drug Manufacturers - General
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$60.57
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$42.52 — $68.64
-12% from high
Market cap
123.7B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
4.2%
P/E
13.3
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Oct 16, 2026

Deep value.

Flat 2025 revenue, lower cash flow, and a 2026 rebound that faces Medicare price limits.

Bullish Beneish: -2.68Altman Z″: 2.16Piotroski: 7/9Fog: 20.3
RED DEEP 77 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Beneish M Earnings manipulation
-2.68
Clean
−3.0 threshold −1.78 +1.0
Altman Z″ Bankruptcy proximity
2.16
Grey zone
0 threshold 1.10 / 2.60 4.0
Piotroski F Fundamental health (0–9)
7
Strong
0 threshold 6+ 9
Fog Index MD&A readability
20.30
Obfuscatory prose
8 threshold ≥ 18 = murky 24
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

The filings describe a company with a single operating segment, a broad oncology and immunology pipeline, and a Legacy Portfolio still facing generic erosion. The forensic screens give mixed signals, and none of them is a fraud alarm. The Beneish M-Score of -2.684 is below the -1.78 threshold and is not in the elevated manipulation-risk zone; this is a screening output, not a finding about the company's accounts. The Altman Z-Score of 2.16 sits in the grey zone between 1.10 and 2.60, which means the model does not place the company clearly in either distress or safety territory. The Piotroski F-Score is 7 of 8 computable signals, a checklist of profitability, leverage and efficiency tests, though it does not capture pricing exposure. The Fog Index of 20.30 is above 18, the label for very hard to read, so the MD&A requires careful effort. The balance sheet shows clearer improvement: long-term debt fell to $42.85 billion from $47.6 billion, and equity rose to $18.47 billion from $16.34 billion. Liabilities still equal about 79% of the $90.04 billion asset base. Pipeline items such as iberdomide, mezigdomide, Camzyos in adolescents, and the 13 early-stage assets from the May 2026 Hengrui agreement add optionality, but the MD&A warns that Medicare maximum fair prices for Eliquis and Pomalyst could accelerate revenue erosion. Readers may want to look at how these pricing rules affect the Growth Portfolio over the next few years.

Catalyst.According to the 10-Q MD&A, revenue rose 6% in the second quarter of 2026 to $12,973 million and 4% year to date to $24,462 million, driven by higher demand and higher average net selling prices across the Growth Portfolio and for Eliquis, partly offset by generics in the Legacy Portfolio. Management points to pipeline items including FDA acceptance of an NDA for iberdomide with a PDUFA date of August 17, 2026, and an sNDA for Camzyos in adolescents with a PDUFA date of September 30, 2026. Gross-to-net adjustments fell to 32% of gross product sales year to date from 46% a year earlier, lifting net product sales to $23,756 million from $22,794 million. Management also expects annual cost savings of approximately $2.0 billion by the end of 2027.

Hidden risk.The 2025 annual numbers are less strong than the growth narrative suggests. Revenue was $48.19 billion in 2025 versus $48.3 billion in 2024, about 0.2% lower, and operating cash flow fell to $14.16 billion from $15.19 billion, roughly 6.8% lower. The 2026 gross-to-net drop is large, and the 10-Q notes that a $331 million reduction to prior-period provisions was recognized in the first half of 2025, which distorts year-over-year comparisons. The MD&A also states that Inflation Reduction Act maximum fair prices for Eliquis took effect January 1, 2026, and that tariff relief through January 2029 may be terminated or not extended. Readers may want to look at the pricing risk factors before relying on the recent growth trend.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what BMY reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
2.3%
of the shares available to trade
Low
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
45.8M
Change since Aug 31
+4.0%
Days to cover
4.0

What it tells us

Few traders are betting against BMY. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.

Little changed since the Aug 31 report (+4.0%).

At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 4.0 days to buy back every borrowed share.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement

The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Bristol-Myers Squibb Company filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Jul 30, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-06-30)Period: 2026-06-300
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 30, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-07-30)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings); Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • May 8, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-05-05)Item 5.07: Shareholder vote results0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 30, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-03-31)Period: 2026-03-310
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 30, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-04-30)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings); Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 25, 2026
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2026-05-05)0
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 11, 2026
    10-K
    Annual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 5, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-02-05)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings); Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Jan 12, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-01-12)Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

If this case caught your eye

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Financial Shenanigans

Howard M. Schilit

Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.

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The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

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Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

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