Yum! Brands, Inc.

YUM Consumer Cyclical · Restaurants
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$150.83
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$134.26 — $170.14
-11% from high
Market cap
41.2B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
2.0%
P/E
18.5
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Oct 16, 2026

Red flags.

Yum! Brands' cash flow grew with revenue, but a $7.33 billion shareholders' deficit persists.

Bearish Beneish: -2.60Altman Z″: -0.76Piotroski: 4/9
RED DEEP 35 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Beneish M Earnings manipulation
-2.60
Clean
−3.0 threshold −1.78 +1.0
Altman Z″ Bankruptcy proximity
-0.76
Distress zone
0 threshold 1.10 / 2.60 4.0
Piotroski F Fundamental health (0–9)
4
Mixed
0 threshold 6+ 9
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

Reading the scores together gives a mixed picture. The Beneish M-Score is -2.599, below the -1.78 threshold and not in the elevated manipulation-risk zone. This is a statistical screen built from accounting ratios, so it reduces but does not eliminate the need to read the statements closely. The Altman Z″-Score of -0.76 falls in the distress zone. This model is designed to flag financial stress, and the $7.33 billion shareholders' deficit is a major input into that result. The Piotroski F-Score is 4 of 7 computable signals, meaning four of the seven checklist tests for profitability, leverage, and efficiency were met. Operating cash flow of $2.01 billion was 1.29 times net income of $1.56 billion, so reported 2025 profit was backed by cash. The Q1 2026 Form 10-Q states there have been no material changes to the risk factors since the 2025 Form 10-K, and KPMG's review reported no material modifications to the interim statements. The risk factors center on a franchise model in which 97% of restaurants are franchised, with Yum China as the largest franchisee under a Master License Agreement for mainland China. Readers may want to look at Note 14 of the 10-Q, where legal proceedings are incorporated by reference, since its contents are not in the excerpt provided. In February 2026, two executives and the CEO of the Pizza Hut Division adopted Rule 10b5-1 trading plans, disclosed in Part II, Item 5. Taken together, the filings show strong cash generation alongside a structurally negative equity position and dependence on franchisee health.

Catalyst.Reported 2025 results show growth across the main lines. Revenues rose to $8.21 billion from $7.55 billion in 2024, an 8.8% increase. Operating income climbed to $2.57 billion from $2.40 billion, net income rose to $1.56 billion from $1.49 billion, and operating cash flow rose to $2.01 billion from $1.69 billion. The filings provided do not include a detailed MD&A discussion of which concepts or regions drove this growth, so readers may want to look at the MD&A section of the 2025 Form 10-K for segment-level drivers. In the first quarter of 2026, the company repurchased 1,174 thousand shares under its May 2024 authorization, leaving $0.9 billion of remaining capacity.

Hidden risk.The balance sheet shows a shareholders' deficit. Equity was -$7.33 billion at December 31, 2025, with liabilities of $15.52 billion against assets of $8.2 billion. The Altman Z″-Score of -0.76 falls in the distress zone, a screening result rather than a forecast of default. The business also depends heavily on franchisees: 97% of restaurants are operated by Concepts' franchisees, and the company is secondarily liable on certain franchisee lease agreements. The risk factors warn that franchisee financial distress, including insolvency, could reduce royalties and slow new unit development. Food safety, PFAS packaging litigation, and avian flu are also named as risks. A casual reader could miss how these tie together.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what YUM reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
5.2%
of the shares available to trade
Moderate
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
12.4M
Change since Aug 31
+39.5%
Days to cover
5.5

What it tells us

A noticeable minority of traders is betting that YUM shares will fall.

Short sellers added to their bets: shares sold short grew 39.5% since the Aug 31 report.

Short sellers would need about 5.5 days of normal trading to buy back every borrowed share. A slow exit like that can make a rush to cover sharper.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement

The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Yum! Brands filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Sep 1, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors; Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials); Item 8.01: Other events
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 28, 2026
    8-K/A
    Current report (amended)Item 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 21, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 7, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 1.01: Signed a material agreement; Item 2.01: Completed an acquisition or sale of assets; Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 7, 2026
    8-K/A
    Current report (amended)Item 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 4, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 30, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • May 6, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-03-31)Period: 2026-03-310
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 29, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-04-29)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 3, 2026
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2026-05-14)0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 1, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-03-26)Item 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors0
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 20, 2026
    10-K
    Annual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

If this case caught your eye

Affiliate links — Filing.fyi earns a commission on Amazon purchases. We pick the books first, attach the link second.

Financial Shenanigans

Howard M. Schilit

Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.

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The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

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Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

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