Wynn Resorts, Limited

WYNN Consumer Cyclical · Resorts & Casinos
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$76.97
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$73.07 — $134.72
-43% from high
Market cap
7.9B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
1.3%
P/E
18.5
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Oct 16, 2026

Watch.

Wynn's 2025 profit fell while a stockholders' deficit and $10.54 billion debt persist.

Caution Beneish: -2.81Altman Z″: 0.71Piotroski: 5/9
RED DEEP 49 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Beneish M Earnings manipulation
-2.81
Clean
−3.0 threshold −1.78 +1.0
Altman Z″ Bankruptcy proximity
0.71
Distress zone
0 threshold 1.10 / 2.60 4.0
Piotroski F Fundamental health (0–9)
5
Mixed
0 threshold 6+ 9
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

The filings describe established luxury resorts and a long-term development plan, but the numbers show earnings and balance-sheet strain. Operating income of $1.12 billion and operating cash flow of $1.35 billion in 2025 show the resorts still generate substantial cash, yet net income fell to $327.33 million and total equity is negative at -$275.49 million. The Beneish M-Score is -2.813, which is below the -1.78 threshold and therefore not in the elevated manipulation-risk zone. This is a screening tool, so a non-elevated reading does not prove the figures are accurate or rule out other issues. The Altman Z-Score, in its Z-double-prime form, is 0.71, which the label places in the distress zone. This model weighs balance-sheet strength and is consistent with the negative equity, but it is a statistical flag rather than a forecast of default. The Piotroski F-Score is 5 of 7 computable signals, a measure of financial strength across profitability, leverage and efficiency, and it is a partial read because only seven signals could be computed. Operating cash flow was 4.13 times net income in 2025, a ratio that is high mainly because reported net income is much lower than cash generation, so readers may want to look at what drove the gap. The MD&A ties the business to Macau VIP win rates and Las Vegas and Encore table-win expectations, while the risk factors tie the company to Macau-specific risks, gaming license maintenance and covenant compliance. Readers may want to weigh the operating strength against the leverage and the negative equity reported in the 10-K, since the MD&A's forward-looking language does not change those figures.

Catalyst.Current drivers are the integrated resorts in Macau, where Wynn Palace and Wynn Macau operate through the approximately 72% owned Wynn Macau, Limited, and in Las Vegas and Everett, Massachusetts, where Wynn Las Vegas, Encore and Encore Boston Harbor generate gaming and hotel revenue. The 10-Q MD&A frames results around operating measures, including an expected Macau VIP win of 3.1% to 3.4% of turnover, expected Las Vegas table games win of 22% to 26%, and expected Encore Boston Harbor table games win of 18% to 22%. On an annual basis, 2025 operating income was $1.12 billion versus $1.13 billion in 2024, and 2025 revenue growth was 0.0%, so the top line was flat. Management also points to Wynn Al Marjan Island in Ras Al Khaimah, currently expected to open in 2027.

Hidden risk.The most material tension is the balance sheet. At 2025 year-end, liabilities of $14.14 billion exceeded assets of $13.11 billion, leaving equity at -$275.49 million, and long-term debt stood at $10.54 billion. Net income fell from $501.08 million in 2024 to $327.33 million in 2025, a decline of about 34.7%, even though operating income was roughly flat. The 10-K risk factors state that the company depends on a limited number of resorts for all of its cash flow and on its subsidiaries' ability to pay dividends, and they list the level of indebtedness, debt service obligations and continued covenant compliance as risks. Readers may want to look at how much of the cash flow depends on each resort and how the debt covenants are structured.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what WYNN reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
11.1%
of the shares available to trade
High
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
9.7M
Change since Aug 31
+7.8%
Days to cover
4.2

What it tells us

A large group of traders is betting that WYNN shares will fall. That is a strong negative view, and also a crowd that would have to buy shares back if the price rises.

Little changed since the Aug 31 report (+7.8%).

At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 4.2 days to buy back every borrowed share.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Annual report, quarterly report & proxy statement

The annual report (10-K), quarterly report (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Wynn Resorts, Limited filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Sep 22, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 1.01: Signed a material agreement
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Sep 10, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 8.01: Other events0
    EDGAR →
  • Sep 10, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 8.01: Other events0
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 31, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 22, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 1.01: Signed a material agreement; Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • May 8, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-05-06)Item 5.07: Shareholder vote results0
    EDGAR →
  • May 7, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-03-31)Period: 2026-03-310
    EDGAR →
  • May 7, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-05-07)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings); Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials); Item 8.01: Other events0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 30, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-04-28)Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 25, 2026
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2026-05-06)0
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 2, 2026
    10-K
    Annual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

If this case caught your eye

Affiliate links — Filing.fyi earns a commission on Amazon purchases. We pick the books first, attach the link second.

Financial Shenanigans

Howard M. Schilit

Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.

View on Amazon →

The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

View on Amazon →

Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

View on Amazon →