W. R. Berkley Corporation

WRB Financial Services · Insurance - Property & Casualty
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$71.01
Jun 29, 2026
52-week range
$62.87 — $78.96
-10% from high
Market cap
26.4B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
56.0%
P/E
15.0
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Jun 29, 2026

Fairly valued.

Fairly Valued (Neutral) — Filing.fyi's reading derived from the latest 10-K and forensic scores.

Neutral Beneish: -2.57Altman Z″: 1.32Piotroski: 5/9
RED DEEP 65 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Beneish M Earnings manipulation
-2.57
Clean
−3.0 threshold −1.78 +1.0
Altman Z″ Bankruptcy proximity
1.32
Grey zone
0 threshold 1.10 / 2.60 4.0
Piotroski F Fundamental health (0–9)
5
Mixed
0 threshold 6+ 9
AI synthesis · grounded in this ticker's SEC filings · drag to highlight, releases the composer

What the filing actually says.

AI · wry-editorial preset

W. R. Berkley Corporation’s most recent 10-Q presents a rather succinct narrative, particularly within its Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations. Item 7, typically a source of detailed operational context, focuses primarily on the effectiveness of the company’s disclosure controls and procedures—internal safeguards designed to ensure financial information is accurately recorded, processed, and reported within specified timeframes. Management, including the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer, concluded these controls were effective as of the March 31, 2026, reporting period end. This emphasis on procedural compliance, while necessary, leaves the reader with limited qualitative insights into the quarter’s financial performance or strategic developments.

The quantitative forensic scores offer a mixed, though not alarming, picture. Beneish’s 1999 eight-ratio earnings-manipulation detector yields an M-Score of -2.5745, which is below the -1.78 threshold, suggesting a lower statistical probability of earnings manipulation. Altman’s 1968 bankruptcy-distress index, the Z″, registers at 1.32, placing W. R. Berkley in the ‘grey zone’ (1.10–2.60), indicating neither strong financial health nor immediate distress. Piotroski’s 2000 nine-point fundamental strength scan, the F-Score, comes in at 5.0, a neutral reading that does not meet the criteria for either weak (<4) or strong (7+) fundamental performance. The Fog Index, a readability score, is not available for this filing.

The provided excerpts from Item 1A, typically reserved for Risk Factors, offer no substantive discussion of specific business risks, instead listing various exhibits and the beginning of the financial statements. Similarly, the MD&A excerpt provides only a statement regarding the effectiveness of disclosure controls and procedures, rather than an analysis of financial results or future outlook. This focus on procedural compliance, rather than operational or strategic insights, means the filing, as excerpted, offers limited qualitative context for the quantitative data. While the balance sheet snippet shows growth in fixed maturity securities and investment funds, the lack of accompanying narrative from MD&A or risk factors leaves the reader without management’s interpretation of these trends or associated exposures, such as the allowance for expected credit losses on fixed maturity securities.

This reading, constrained by the provided excerpts, offers a partial view of W. R. Berkley Corporation’s financial health, primarily through quantitative forensic metrics and a procedural statement on controls. It does not, however, provide the qualitative depth typically found in a comprehensive MD&A or detailed risk factors, which are crucial for understanding the operational context behind the numbers, including investment strategies or underwriting performance. Therefore, while the scores suggest no immediate red flags, assessing whether the security is mispriced requires a broader examination of the full filing. This includes a thorough review of management’s strategic outlook, detailed risk disclosures, and the complete financial statements to form a holistic view.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Filing timeline

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  • May 1, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-03-31)Period: 2026-03-310
    Read →
  • Apr 22, 2026
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2026-06-03)0
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  • Apr 21, 2026
    8-K
    Material event (2026-04-21)### Item 2.02 Results of Operations and Financial Condition . Reference is made to the press release of W. R. Berkley Corporation (the “Company”) relating to th0
    Read →
  • Feb 27, 2026
    10-K
    Annual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310
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  • Jan 26, 2026
    8-K
    Material event (2026-01-26)### Item 2.02 Results of Operations and Financial Condition . Reference is made to the press release of W. R. Berkley Corporation (the “Company”) relating to th0
    Read →
  • Dec 5, 2025
    8-K
    Material event (2025-12-05)### Item 8.01 Other Events On December 5, 2025, W . R. Berkley Corporation (the “Company”) issued a press release announcing that the Company has been informed 0
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Further reading · curated for this filing

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