W. R. Berkley Corporation
WRB Financial Services · Insurance - Property & CasualtyFairly valued.
Revenue and premiums grew in 2025, but operating cash flow slipped slightly year over year.
The four readings.
What the filing actually says.
Read together, the figures show a company that grew its top line and kept earnings and the balance sheet moving in the same direction, with one soft spot in cash flow. The Beneish M-Score is -2.575, which falls below the -1.78 threshold and is labeled not in the elevated zone. In plain English, the standard earnings-manipulation screen did not flag the 2025 numbers. That is a screening result, not proof that the numbers are clean, and it does not replace reading the notes. The Piotroski F-Score is 5 of 6 computable signals, meaning five of the six checks that could be computed from the data passed. The Piotroski checklist looks at profitability, leverage, liquidity and operating efficiency trends, so a high count suggests broadly stable fundamentals, though the one failed signal is worth identifying in the full filing. Operating cash flow divided by net income is 2.01 for 2025, so cash generation roughly doubled reported earnings, a reassuring relationship for an insurer whose reserves are estimates. The company's own disclosure work points the same way: the Q1 2026 10-Q concludes disclosure controls are effective and reports no change in internal control over financial reporting during the quarter. Segment mix matters too. Insurance wrote $11.18 billion of 2025 net premiums, 88.0% of the total, through excess and surplus lines, admitted and specialty personal lines businesses. Reinsurance & Monoline Excess wrote $1.53 billion. Financial strength ratings of A+ from A.M. Best, AA- from S&P and Fitch, and A1 from Moody's for certain subsidiaries are the external checks on its ability to pay claims. Readers may want to look at Note 20 for the legal matters the 10-Q references, since the excerpt provided does not describe them.
Catalyst.The filings provided show growth tied to W. R. Berkley's two segments. Net premiums written rose to $12.71 billion in 2025 from $11.97 billion in 2024, with Insurance contributing $11.18 billion and Reinsurance & Monoline Excess $1.53 billion. Total revenues reached $14.71 billion, up 7.8% from $13.64 billion, and net income was $1.78 billion versus $1.76 billion. In the first quarter of 2026, the company repurchased 4,471,634 shares under an authorization raised to 25,000,000 shares on January 8, 2026, leaving 21,055,056 shares available at March 31, 2026. The MD&A text in the excerpt does not explain these drivers in detail.
Hidden risk.The risk-factor text provided states there have been no material changes from the 2025 Form 10-K, and the excerpt is largely a forward-looking list. Several items on it bear directly on an insurer's numbers: claims development and reserve estimation, catastrophic and climate-related losses, the availability of reinsurance, and whether reinsurers can pay recoverables owed to the company. The cash-flow line deserves a closer look: operating cash flow slipped from $3.68 billion in 2024 to $3.58 billion in 2025, a decline of about 2.7%, even as premiums and revenue grew. Liabilities rose to $34.36 billion, but equity grew faster, to $9.7 billion.
What traders are betting.
The metric
Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.
- Shares sold short
- 13.1M
- Change since Aug 31
- −13.7%
- Days to cover
- 3.6
What it tells us
A noticeable minority of traders is betting that WRB shares will fall.
Short sellers closed some of their bets: shares sold short fell 13.7% since the Aug 31 report.
At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 3.6 days to buy back every borrowed share.
How investors use it
- Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
- Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
- Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
- Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.
Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement
The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) W. R. Berkley filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.
- Jul 31, 202610-QQuarterly report0EDGAR →
- Jul 20, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0EDGAR →
- May 1, 202610-QQuarterly report (2026-03-31)Period: 2026-03-310EDGAR →
- Apr 22, 2026DEF 14AProxy statement (2026-06-03)0EDGAR →
- Apr 21, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-04-21)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0EDGAR →
- Feb 27, 202610-KAnnual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310EDGAR →
- Jan 26, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-01-26)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0EDGAR →
- Dec 5, 20258-KCurrent report (2025-12-05)Item 8.01: Other events0EDGAR →
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