Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation

WAB Industrials · Railroads
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$287.76
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$186.06 — $306.64
-6% from high
Market cap
48.6B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
0.4%
P/E
38.7
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Oct 16, 2026

Fairly valued.

Wabtec's sales and profit grew in 2025, but debt and liabilities rose faster than equity.

Neutral Beneish: -2.47Altman Z″: 2.36Piotroski: 6/9
RED DEEP 65 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Beneish M Earnings manipulation
-2.47
Clean
−3.0 threshold −1.78 +1.0
Altman Z″ Bankruptcy proximity
2.36
Grey zone
0 threshold 1.10 / 2.60 4.0
Piotroski F Fundamental health (0–9)
6
Mixed
0 threshold 6+ 9
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

The filings describe a company growing earnings while carrying more borrowed money. The 2025 annual results show revenue of $11.17 billion, net income of $1.17 billion and operating income of $1.79 billion, compared with $10.39 billion, $1.06 billion and $1.61 billion in 2024. Operating cash flow was $1.76 billion, or 1.50 times net income, so reported profit was backed by cash, though operating cash flow itself fell from $1.83 billion. The Beneish M-Score is -2.469, which is below -1.78 and not in the elevated manipulation-risk zone. That is a statistical screen built from ratios such as receivables and margins, so a non-elevated result is not proof of clean accounts, but it did not trigger a closer read. The Altman Z-double-prime score is 2.36, in the grey zone between 1.10 and 2.60, meaning the model does not place Wabtec clearly in either its safe or distress range. Wabtec is an industrial manufacturer rather than a bank, so the score applies without the financial-firm caveat. The Piotroski F-Score is 6 of 9 computable signals, a count of simple tests covering profitability, leverage and operating efficiency, and six of those signals were met. Readers may want to look at the legal proceedings in Note 14, which the 10-Q references but which is not in this excerpt. The risk factors name asbestos-related matters, pension liabilities, warranties, product liabilities and litigation involving principal customers, and the forward-looking list includes tariffs and retaliatory trade measures. The Freight Segment, about 72% of 2025 net sales, relies heavily on its installed locomotive base for aftermarket revenue. The Transit Segment, about 28% of sales, depends on government transit funding, which the filing lists as a risk. Readers may want to look at how the Senior Notes and credit facilities referenced in the share repurchase disclosure are serviced as long-term debt rises from $3.48 billion to $4.29 billion.

Catalyst.According to the 2025 annual filing's business description and the Q1 2026 10-Q, growth is led by the Freight Segment, about 72% of 2025 net sales, with roughly 58% of that in the aftermarket and tied to a base of nearly 24,600 locomotives. The Transit Segment, about 28% of net sales, has about 56% in the aftermarket. Reported 2025 revenue reached $11.17 billion, up 7.5% from $10.39 billion, and operating income rose to $1.79 billion from $1.61 billion. The company cites 2025 acquisitions of Evident's Inspection Technologies division and Frauscher as bolt-on growth moves. Management frames its outlook around infrastructure investment, digitalization, and the UNIFE forecast of a 3% compound annual growth rate for the global rail market through 2027.

Hidden risk.The most material tension is in the balance sheet and cash flow. Total liabilities rose to $10.88 billion at the end of 2025 from $8.57 billion in 2024, an increase of about 27%, while equity rose about 10% to $11.14 billion. Long-term debt climbed to $4.29 billion from $3.48 billion. Operating cash flow fell to $1.76 billion from $1.83 billion even as net income rose to $1.17 billion from $1.06 billion. Meanwhile the board reauthorized a $1.2 billion repurchase program on February 6, 2026, and 977,379 shares were repurchased in the first quarter of 2026. The 10-Q states there were no material changes to risk factors, so the tariff and trade-policy risks it lists still apply.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what WAB reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
2.7%
of the shares available to trade
Low
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
3.5M
Change since Aug 31
+6.4%
Days to cover
4.4

What it tells us

Few traders are betting against WAB. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.

Little changed since the Aug 31 report (+6.4%).

At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 4.4 days to buy back every borrowed share.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement

The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Oct 1, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 2.03: New debt or other financial obligation0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 22, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings); Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 22, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 22, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-04-22)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings); Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 22, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-03-31)Period: 2026-03-310
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 31, 2026
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2026-05-12)0
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 3, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-03-03)Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 13, 2026
    10-K
    Annual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 11, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-02-11)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings); Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

If this case caught your eye

Affiliate links — Filing.fyi earns a commission on Amazon purchases. We pick the books first, attach the link second.

Financial Shenanigans

Howard M. Schilit

Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.

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The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

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Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

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