Vistra Corp.
VST Utilities · Utilities - Independent Power ProducersNot yet scored
Filing.fyi has not computed forensic scores for VST yet. Scores appear after the company's next data refresh.
What the filing actually says.
Read together, the reported figures describe a company whose earnings recovered sharply after a difficult stretch, while its balance sheet and cash generation call for a closer look. Net income moved from losses of $1.27 billion in 2021 and $1.23 billion in 2022 to profits of $1.49 billion in 2023 and $2.66 billion in 2024. Revenue grew more modestly, from $15.63 billion in 2022 to $14.76 billion in 2024, so the 2024 earnings improvement is not explained by top-line growth alone. Operating income of $4.08 billion in 2024 was about 53% above 2023, which points to margin changes that the MD&A would need to explain; that text is not part of the data provided here. Cash flow tells a different story from earnings. Operating cash flow was negative $206 million in 2021 and $485 million in 2022, rose to $5.45 billion in 2023, and then fell to $4.56 billion in 2024. Across these years, reported earnings and operating cash flow did not move together, and a careful reader would want to see how the two reconcile. The balance sheet is also more leveraged than before. Total assets reached $37.77 billion in 2024, while equity of $5.57 billion remains below the $8.29 billion reported for 2021. No forensic scores are on file for this company, so the Beneish, Piotroski, Altman, and Fog Index results cannot be discussed, and the absence of those scores should not be read as a sign either way. Risk-factor text is also missing, so the company's own description of its exposures is not reflected here. Readers may want to look at the MD&A, the risk factors section of the 10-K, the cash flow statement, and the debt and commitments notes to test whether the 2024 earnings gain is matched by durable cash generation and to see which specific obligations sit within the larger liability base.
Catalyst.The data provided here does not include MD&A text, so this section cannot attribute the company's results to specific segments, programs, or market conditions. The reported figures show 2024 revenue of $14.76 billion, up from $13.8 billion in 2023, a rise of about 7.0%. Operating income increased to $4.08 billion from $2.66 billion, roughly 53% higher, and net income rose to $2.66 billion from $1.49 billion. Readers may want to look at the MD&A section of the company's 10-K to see what management credits for these gains.
Hidden risk.Operating cash flow moved in the opposite direction from earnings. It fell to $4.56 billion in 2024 from $5.45 billion in 2023, a decline of about 16%, even as net income rose to $2.66 billion. Total liabilities climbed to $32.19 billion from $27.64 billion, a 16.5% increase, while equity grew only about 4.9%, to $5.57 billion. Liabilities now run roughly 5.8 times equity. Readers may want to look at the cash flow statement and the debt and commitments notes to understand why cash generation lagged earnings. Risk-factor text and forensic scores are not in the data, so this paragraph relies on the reported figures alone.
What traders are betting.
The metric
Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.
- Shares sold short
- 10.5M
- Change since Aug 31
- −2.7%
- Days to cover
- 2.2
What it tells us
Few traders are betting against VST. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.
Little changed since the Aug 31 report (−2.7%).
At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 2.2 days to buy back every borrowed share.
How investors use it
- Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
- Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
- Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
- Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.
Quarterly report
The quarterly report (10-Q) and current reports (8-K) Vistra filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.
- Oct 2, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 1.01: Signed a material agreement; Item 2.03: New debt or other financial obligationEDGAR →★ Curriculum-relevant
- Sep 24, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 1.01: Signed a material agreement; Item 8.01: Other eventsEDGAR →★ Curriculum-relevant
- Aug 7, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0EDGAR →
- Aug 7, 202610-QQuarterly report0EDGAR →
- Jul 16, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 1.01: Signed a material agreement; Item 2.03: New debt or other financial obligationEDGAR →★ Curriculum-relevant
- Jul 14, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 8.01: Other events0EDGAR →
If this case caught your eye
Financial Shenanigans
Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.
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