Vertex Pharmaceuticals Incorporated

VRTX Healthcare · Biotechnology
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$508.75
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$403.16 — $560.25
-9% from high
Market cap
128.9B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
—
No dividend declared
P/E
29.5
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Oct 16, 2026

Fairly valued.

Vertex swung back to $3.95 billion profit; CF medicines still drive revenue.

Neutral Beneish: -2.19Altman Z″: 7.50Piotroski: 6/9
RED DEEP 69 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Beneish M Earnings manipulation
-2.19
Elevated
−3.0 threshold −1.78 +1.0
Altman Z″ Bankruptcy proximity
7.50
Safe
0 threshold 1.10 / 2.60 4.0
Piotroski F Fundamental health (0–9)
6
Mixed
0 threshold 6+ 9
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

The most important fact in these filings is the swing from a 2024 loss to 2025 profit, paired with a business still concentrated in CF medicines. Operating income moved from negative $232.9 million in 2024 to $4.17 billion in 2025, and operating cash flow moved from negative $492.6 million to $3.63 billion. Operating cash flow was 0.92 times net income in 2025, meaning reported earnings were largely backed by cash. Total assets were $25.64 billion against $6.98 billion of liabilities, and equity rose to $18.67 billion from $16.41 billion. The forensic scores are explained here in plain English. The Beneish M-Score is -2.188, below the -1.78 threshold, so it is not in the elevated manipulation-risk zone; this is a screening result, not proof that the numbers are accurate or free of problems. The Altman Z-Score is 7.50, in the safe zone, which is a rough indicator of balance-sheet distress risk rather than a measure of value. The Piotroski F-Score is 6 of 7 computable signals, meaning six of the seven applicable fiscal-strength tests passed, with one not met. Readers may want to look at the Item 1A discussion of CASGEVY, where the filing says manufacturing cost as a percentage of revenue is significantly higher than for CF medicines and that side effects tied to the myeloablative preconditioning regimen could affect uptake, and at the JOURNAVX competition risk. The share repurchase program has used about $963 million of its $4.0 billion authorization since May 2025, a capital allocation choice that readers may want to compare against future operating cash flow. Overall, the data shows a profitable, cash-generating company whose results depend heavily on one franchise and on pricing policy outcomes outside its control.

Catalyst.Revenue for 2025 reached $12 billion, up 8.9% from $11.02 billion in 2024, and 2025 net income was $3.95 billion versus a $535.6 million loss in 2024. The 10-Q MD&A excerpt for the quarter ended March 31, 2026 is mostly forward-looking statement language, so it adds little quarterly financial detail. The drivers it names are continued growth of CF medicines through new approvals, label extensions, treatment of younger patients and expansion into additional geographies, plus the anticipated launch of povetacicept for IgAN, where the company refers to an expedited six-month FDA review after BLA acceptance. Management also reports repurchasing 741,135 shares in the first quarter of 2026 under a $4.0 billion program, with about $3.04 billion remaining.

Hidden risk.The filings show heavy concentration. The 10-K states that substantially all net product revenues come from CF medicines, and it says that concentration magnifies exposure to supply disruptions, safety issues and pricing pressure. Pricing risk is named specifically: the Colorado PDAB review that included TRIKAFTA, the Inflation Reduction Act, and a proposed CMS GUARD Model on most-favored-nation pricing, which the filing says could reduce pricing for the company's products. Ex-U.S. reimbursement has also been slow in some countries. The 2024 operating loss of $232.9 million and operating cash outflow of $492.6 million show how quickly results can swing, so the 2025 rebound of $4.17 billion in operating income is best read as one year within a longer series.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what VRTX reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
2.0%
of the shares available to trade
Low
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
4.5M
Change since Aug 31
−3.4%
Days to cover
4.4

What it tells us

Few traders are betting against VRTX. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.

Little changed since the Aug 31 report (−3.4%).

At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 4.4 days to buy back every borrowed share.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement

The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Vertex Pharmaceuticals filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Sep 1, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 4, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report0
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 3, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • May 5, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-03-31)Period: 2026-03-310
    EDGAR →
  • May 4, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-05-04)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 29, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-04-28)Item 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 2, 2026
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2026-05-13)0
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 31, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-03-31)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 13, 2026
    10-K
    Annual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

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Financial Shenanigans

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The Interpretation of Financial Statements

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The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

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Quality of Earnings

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