Vertiv Holdings Co

VRT Industrials · Electrical Equipment & Parts
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$214.75
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$147.82 — $379.94
-43% from high
Market cap
82.7B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
0.1%
P/E
53.7
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Oct 16, 2026

Deep value.

Vertiv's 2025 revenue rose 27.7% while its order backlog grew to $15.0 billion.

Bullish Beneish: -2.44Altman Z″: 3.08Piotroski: 6/9
RED DEEP 83 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Beneish M Earnings manipulation
-2.44
Clean
−3.0 threshold −1.78 +1.0
Altman Z″ Bankruptcy proximity
3.08
Safe
0 threshold 1.10 / 2.60 4.0
Piotroski F Fundamental health (0–9)
6
Mixed
0 threshold 6+ 9
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

The filings describe a business whose reported growth is supported by cash generation. Net sales for 2025 were $10.23 billion, up 27.7% from $8.01 billion, and the MD&A links that growth to demand for data centers supporting artificial intelligence and high-performance compute. Geographically, 62% of 2025 net sales were transacted in the Americas, 20% in Asia Pacific and 18% in Europe, Middle East and Africa, so a large share depends on one region's data center build-out. Operating cash flow of $2.11 billion against net income of $1.33 billion gives a ratio of 1.59, meaning cash from operations exceeded reported earnings. Readers may want to look at the working capital lines in the cash flow statement to see what drove that gap. The Beneish M-Score of -2.438 is below -1.78 and is labeled not in the elevated manipulation-risk zone. That is a screening result rather than proof of accuracy, and it does not replace reading the notes. The Altman Z″-Score of 3.08 falls in the safe zone, which describes balance-sheet distress risk under that model, not future performance. The Piotroski F-Score is 6 of 7 computable signals, meaning most computable tests were met and one was not. Equity rose to $3.94 billion from $2.43 billion, while long-term debt eased to $2.89 billion from $2.91 billion. The Outlook section also flags U.S. tariffs, the US-Israel and Iran war, and foreign exchange rates as factors that may affect supply chains, input costs and customer demand. Taken together, the filings show strong reported growth and generally solid scores, and the key question for a careful reader is how much of the $15.0 billion backlog converts to revenue on schedule.

Catalyst.According to the MD&A, the main driver is demand for data centers supporting artificial intelligence and high-performance compute. Management says capital investments for the quarter ended March 31, 2026 were significantly higher than in the same quarter of 2025, and it anticipates further investment in global capacity. Product direction includes hybrid air and liquid cooling, converged physical infrastructure, and high voltage direct current power architectures. Full-year 2025 net sales reached $10.23 billion, up 27.7% from $8.01 billion, and operating income rose to $1.83 billion from $1.37 billion. Net income was $1.33 billion, compared with $495.8 million in 2024.

Hidden risk.Backlog rose to $15.0 billion at December 31, 2025 from $7.2 billion a year earlier, but the 10-K states that orders may be subject to cancellation or rescheduling by the customer, and only the majority of that backlog is described as firm. The risk factors also list failure to remediate material weaknesses in internal controls over financial reporting, a point a casual reader may skip because the headline totals look strong. Long-term debt of $2.89 billion sits alongside covenant restrictions in the credit agreements, which the risk factors connect to interest rate hedges and counterparty default. Readers may want to look at the controls discussion in the 10-K to see how these weaknesses are described.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what VRT reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
3.7%
of the shares available to trade
Low
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
14.4M
Change since Aug 31
+4.5%
Days to cover
2.8

What it tells us

Few traders are betting against VRT. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.

Little changed since the Aug 31 report (+4.5%).

At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 2.8 days to buy back every borrowed share.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement

The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Vertiv Holdings Co filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Sep 24, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Sep 2, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 1.01: Signed a material agreement; Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Sep 2, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 8.01: Other events0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 29, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings); Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 29, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 27, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-04-27)Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 24, 2026
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2026-06-17)0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 22, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-03-31)Period: 2026-03-310
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 22, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-04-22)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 13, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-04-13)Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 13, 2026
    10-K
    Annual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

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Financial Shenanigans

Howard M. Schilit

Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.

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The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

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Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

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