Valero Energy Corporation

VLO Energy · Oil & Gas Refining & Marketing
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$266.32
Jun 29, 2026
52-week range
$130.78 — $272.17
-2% from high
Market cap
79.1B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
185.0%
P/E
19.5
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Jun 29, 2026

Fairly valued.

Fairly Valued (Neutral) — Filing.fyi's reading derived from the latest 10-K and forensic scores.

Neutral Beneish: -2.76Altman Z″: 1.48Piotroski: 5/9
RED DEEP 65 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Beneish M Earnings manipulation
-2.76
Clean
−3.0 threshold −1.78 +1.0
Altman Z″ Bankruptcy proximity
1.48
Grey zone
0 threshold 1.10 / 2.60 4.0
Piotroski F Fundamental health (0–9)
5
Mixed
0 threshold 6+ 9
AI synthesis · grounded in this ticker's SEC filings · drag to highlight, releases the composer

What the filing actually says.

AI · wry-editorial preset

Valero Energy Corporation’s latest 10-Q introduces a specific non-GAAP financial measure (a metric not adhering to generally accepted accounting principles, often adjusted by management) for capital investments. The MD&A, in Item 7, details “Capital Investments Attributable to Valero,” defining it as all capital expenditures, deferred turnaround and catalyst costs, and investments in nonconsolidated joint ventures, with specific exclusions. Notably, this measure removes the portion of DGD’s capital investments attributable to the other joint venture member, despite Valero being a 50 percent joint venture member in DGD and consolidate its financial statements. This reporting choice frames the discussion of liquidity and capital resources by presenting a tailored view of investment activity, rather than a purely GAAP-driven one. The company’s current assets increased from $23,210 million to $27,825 million, driven by cash and cash equivalents rising to $5,733 million from $4,688 million, and receivables, net, growing from $9,877 million to $13,410 million between December 31, 2025, and March 31, 2026.

Forensic scores offer a mixed perspective. Beneish’s 1999 eight-ratio earnings-manipulation detector (Beneish, 1999) registered a score of -2.7591. This value falls well below the -1.78 threshold, suggesting a lower probability of earnings manipulation based on the model’s parameters. However, Altman’s Z″ — a 1968 bankruptcy-distress index (Altman, 1968) — came in at 1.48. This places the company within the “grey zone” (1.10–2.60), indicating that while not in immediate distress, it does not exhibit the robust financial health of firms scoring above 2.60. Piotroski’s F-Score, a 9-point fundamental strength scan (Piotroski, 2000), yielded a 5.0. This score is neither strong (7+) nor weak (<4), suggesting a neutral fundamental position according to the nine criteria.

The MD&A’s detailed explanation of “Capital Investments Attributable to Valero” underscores management’s specific approach to financial reporting. This non-GAAP financial measure is explicitly carved out to exclude certain capital investments related to the DGD joint venture, even though Valero consolidates DGD’s financial statements and its operations compose the Renewable Diesel segment. The choice to present a non-GAAP metric for capital investments, particularly when a joint venture’s financials are consolidated, requires careful consideration from the reader. It provides a management-specific lens on capital allocation, which may differ significantly from a solely GAAP-based perspective. This distinction is crucial for understanding the true scope of capital deployment and its impact on the company’s overall financial condition, as detailed in Item 7. The increase in receivables, net, from $9,877 million to $13,410 million also warrants attention in the context of these capital investments.

This filing, like all others, offers a snapshot, not a crystal ball. It illuminates Valero’s specific reporting practices, such as its use of non-GAAP capital investment metrics and the implications of its DGD joint venture consolidation. The forensic scores provide quantitative signals regarding potential financial health and reporting quality, with Altman’s Z″ suggesting a “watch” posture. What the 10-Q cannot provide is a definitive answer on the security’s intrinsic value or its future performance in a volatile energy market. It does, however, provide the raw material for an informed assessment of the company’s financial condition and management’s transparency. Read the 10-Q. Decide for yourself.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Filing timeline

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  • May 8, 2026
    8-K
    Material event (2026-05-07)### Item 5.02 Departure of Directors or Certain Officers; Election of Directors; Appointment of Certain Officers; Compensatory Arrangements of Certain Officers 0
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  • Apr 30, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-03-31)Period: 2026-03-310
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  • Apr 30, 2026
    8-K
    Material event (2026-04-30)### Item 2.02 Results of Operations and Financial Condition . On April 30, 2026, Valero Energy Corporation (the “Company”) issued a press release announcing the0
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  • Mar 19, 2026
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2026-05-07)0
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  • Mar 9, 2026
    8-K
    Material event (2026-03-05)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    Read →
  • Feb 25, 2026
    10-K
    Annual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310
    Read →
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Further reading · curated for this filing

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