Uber Technologies, Inc.

UBER Technology · Software - Application
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$71.27
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$65.41 — $100.35
-29% from high
Market cap
145.6B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
—
No dividend declared
P/E
15.6
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Oct 16, 2026

Watch.

Uber's profits and cash flow rose sharply in 2025, but tax and driver-classification exposures remain.

Caution Beneish: -2.32Altman Z″: 1.06Piotroski: 6/9
RED DEEP 49 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Beneish M Earnings manipulation
-2.32
Clean
−3.0 threshold −1.78 +1.0
Altman Z″ Bankruptcy proximity
1.06
Distress zone
0 threshold 1.10 / 2.60 4.0
Piotroski F Fundamental health (0–9)
6
Mixed
0 threshold 6+ 9
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

The filings show a company whose reported profitability and cash generation have improved markedly, while several structural exposures remain. Revenue grew 18.3% to $52.02 billion, operating income reached $5.57 billion, and operating cash flow of $10.1 billion was close to net income of $10.05 billion, producing an operating cash flow to net income ratio of 1.00. The Beneish M-Score of -2.319 is below the -1.78 threshold and is not in the elevated manipulation-risk zone. That is a screening result, not proof that the numbers are accurate, but it does not flag the earnings-to-cash relationship as a concern on this measure. The Altman Z-Score variant reported here, the Z-double-prime score, is 1.06, which the code labels as the distress zone. This formula is a screen for financial stress and does not capture a company that is currently profitable and generating cash, so the label should be read as a balance-sheet screen rather than a forecast of failure. Readers may want to look at the balance sheet itself, where total liabilities of $33.72 billion against assets of $61.8 billion and equity of $27.04 billion show a substantial obligation load. The Piotroski F-Score is 6 of 8 computable signals, meaning six of the eight tests the code could evaluate were met, which points to generally sound financial signals with two not met. Beyond the scores, the most material items in the filings are the tax and legal exposures: pay-to-play prepayments in several jurisdictions, the driver classification challenges involving more than 150,000 arbitration demands in the United States, and the limits on net operating loss use. The Careem data-sharing issue, which the filing says could lead to government fines or penalties, is another specifically named item. The filings describe these matters as ongoing, and their outcomes are not in the data provided.

Catalyst.According to the FY2025 annual figures, revenue reached $52.02 billion, up 18.3% from $43.98 billion in 2024. Operating income rose to $5.57 billion from $2.8 billion, and operating cash flow reached $10.1 billion versus $7.14 billion. Risk-factor text describes continued heavy investment in new offerings, including autonomous vehicle technologies, and acquisitions such as Careem, which the company says it expects to keep pursuing. The 10-Q excerpt for the quarter ended March 31, 2026 is largely tax and acquisition risk language, so the most concrete recent results are the annual figures above.

Hidden risk.Net income of $10.05 billion in 2025 exceeded operating income of $5.57 billion by about $4.48 billion. The excerpts provided do not explain that gap, so readers may want to look at the non-operating and tax lines in the full 10-K. The tax risk factors are material: the filing says certain jurisdictions, including Australia, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the UK, require assessed taxes to be paid before contesting them, a practice the filing calls pay-to-play that could strain liquidity. Long-term debt also rose to $10.52 billion at year-end 2025 from $8.35 billion a year earlier.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what UBER reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
2.5%
of the shares available to trade
Low
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
48.8M
Change since Aug 31
+8.1%
Days to cover
2.6

What it tells us

Few traders are betting against UBER. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.

Little changed since the Aug 31 report (+8.1%).

At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 2.6 days to buy back every borrowed share.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Annual report, quarterly report & proxy statement

The annual report (10-K), quarterly report (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Uber Technologies filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Sep 15, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 8.01: Other events0
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 7, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 1.01: Signed a material agreement; Item 1.02: Ended a material agreement; Item 2.03: New debt or other financial obligation
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 5, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 16, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 1.01: Signed a material agreement; Item 2.03: New debt or other financial obligation; Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • May 11, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-05-05)Item 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors0
    EDGAR →
  • May 8, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-05-04)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    EDGAR →
  • May 6, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-05-06)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • May 6, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-03-31)Period: 2026-03-310
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 23, 2026
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2026-05-04)0
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 13, 2026
    10-K
    Annual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

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Financial Shenanigans

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The Interpretation of Financial Statements

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The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

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Quality of Earnings

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