United Airlines Holdings, Inc.

UAL Industrials · Airlines
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$135.19
Jun 29, 2026
52-week range
$78.33 — $138.44
-2% from high
Market cap
43.9B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
No dividend declared
P/E
12.1
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Jun 29, 2026

Fairly valued.

Fairly Valued (Neutral) — Filing.fyi's reading derived from the latest 10-K and forensic scores.

Neutral Beneish: -2.71Altman Z″: 0.96Piotroski: 7/9
RED DEEP 67 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Beneish M Earnings manipulation
-2.71
Clean
−3.0 threshold −1.78 +1.0
Altman Z″ Bankruptcy proximity
0.96
Distress zone
0 threshold 1.10 / 2.60 4.0
Piotroski F Fundamental health (0–9)
7
Strong
0 threshold 6+ 9
AI synthesis · grounded in this ticker's SEC filings · drag to highlight, releases the composer

What the filing actually says.

AI · wry-editorial preset

United Airlines Holdings, Inc.’s most recent 10-Q presents a mixed financial picture, notably with an Altman Z″ of 0.96 — Altman’s 1968 bankruptcy-distress index, where scores below 1.10 suggest significant financial distress. This signal appears even as the Beneish M-Score, Beneish’s 1999 eight-ratio earnings-manipulation detector, registers -2.7074, which is below the -1.78 threshold for elevated manipulation risk. The MD&A, Management’s Discussion and Analysis, also contains a notable passage on the inherent uncertainty of forecasting, stating that “it is not possible to predict or identify all such factors” that could impact results. This forthrightly acknowledges the dynamic environment in which the company operates and the limitations of forward-looking statements.

The forensic scores offer a divergent narrative. The Beneish M-Score of -2.7074, for instance, indicates that the company’s reported accruals (revenue booked but not yet collected) and other financial ratios do not suggest an elevated risk of earnings manipulation. However, Altman’s Z″ of 0.96 places the company firmly in the “distress” zone, signaling potential solvency concerns based on profitability, leverage, liquidity, and activity ratios. Counterbalancing this, the Piotroski F-Score, a 9-point fundamental strength scan developed by Piotroski in 2000, registers a strong 7.0 out of 9. This score suggests robust fundamental health across profitability, liquidity, and operating efficiency criteria. The Fog Index, a readability score where 12 equals newspaper clarity and 18+ suggests obfuscation, is not available for this filing.

The MD&A underscores management’s perspective on uncertainty, noting that “internal projections, beliefs and assumptions upon which we base our expectations may change.” This is a standard disclosure, yet its prominence highlights the inherent volatility of the airline industry, where factors like fuel costs, labor disputes, and global events can rapidly alter financial trajectories. For investors, this means that even the company’s own forward-looking statements are subject to significant shifts, making precise long-term forecasting challenging. The passage also emphasizes that the listed risk factors are not exhaustive, reminding readers that it is “not possible to predict or identify all such factors.” This candid admission of forecasting limitations serves as a crucial context for interpreting any operational or financial outlook presented within the filing.

This filing, through its forensic scores and management’s discussion, offers a snapshot of UAL’s financial health and its stated operational outlook as of March 31, 2026. It highlights a tension between strong fundamental signals from the Piotroski F-Score and a distress warning from Altman’s Z″. However, the document does not predict future market conditions, the impact of unforeseen global events, or the efficacy of management’s strategic responses. It cannot, for instance, quantify the future demand for air travel or the trajectory of fuel prices. While it provides detailed financial statements, it does not offer a definitive verdict on whether the security is mispriced. That assessment requires a broader analysis of industry trends and macroeconomic factors beyond the scope of this particular filing.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Filing timeline

View all on EDGAR →
  • Apr 27, 2026
    8-K
    Material event (2026-04-27)### Item 7.01 Regulation FD Disclosure . On April 27, 2026, United Airlines Holdings, Inc. (“UAL”), the holding company whose subsidiary is United Airlines, Inc0
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  • Apr 22, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-03-31)Period: 2026-03-310
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  • Apr 21, 2026
    8-K
    Material event (2026-04-21)### Item 2.02 Results of Operations and Financial Condition . On April 21, 2026, United Airlines Holdings, Inc. ("UAL"), the holding company whose subsidiary is0
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  • Apr 7, 2026
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2026-05-19)0
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  • Feb 12, 2026
    10-K
    Annual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310
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  • Feb 6, 2026
    8-K
    Material event (2026-02-06)### Item 1.01 Entry into a Material Definitive Agreement . On February 6, 2026, United Airlines Holdings, Inc. (formerly known as United Continental Holdings, I0
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Further reading · curated for this filing

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