The Trade Desk, Inc.

TTD Communication Services · Advertising Agencies
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$13.13
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$11.62 — $55.11
-76% from high
Market cap
6.2B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
—
No dividend declared
P/E
15.8
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Oct 16, 2026

Deep value.

Operating cash flow runs well ahead of net income; client concentration is the key tension.

Bullish Beneish: -7.42Altman Z″: 3.17Piotroski: 6/9
RED DEEP 83 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Beneish M Earnings manipulation
-7.42
Clean
−3.0 threshold −1.78 +1.0
Altman Z″ Bankruptcy proximity
3.17
Safe
0 threshold 1.10 / 2.60 4.0
Piotroski F Fundamental health (0–9)
6
Mixed
0 threshold 6+ 9
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

The forensic screens in this data are reassuring on their face. The Beneish M-Score is -7.415, below -1.78, which places it outside the elevated manipulation-risk zone. That is a screening result: it means the model found no elevated flag, not that the reported numbers are verified. The Altman Z-Score (Z-double-prime variant) of 3.17 falls in the safe zone, which describes low balance-sheet distress risk on this model; it is a screen, not a forecast. The Piotroski F-Score is 6 of 7 computable signals, meaning six of the seven tests that could be calculated were passed. The operating cash flow to net income ratio of 2.24, derived from $992.72 million against $443.3 million, shows cash generation well ahead of reported profit, and the excerpts do not break down that gap. The balance sheet moved in a less comfortable direction: total liabilities rose from $3.16 billion to $3.67 billion while equity fell from $2.95 billion to $2.48 billion, and the excerpts provided do not explain the equity decline. The business-model risks in the filing are specific. The 10-K says two holding companies each exceeded 10% of 2025 gross billings, and the 10-Q describes master services agreements that let clients set spend and terminate on limited notice. Google is named as both a major inventory supplier and a competitor. The dual-class structure gives insiders substantial control over key decisions, and the filing names Jeff T. Green as a key employee. Readers may want to look at how these client, supplier, and governance dependencies interact with the strong cash figures and the shift in the balance sheet.

Catalyst.According to the 10-K filed 2026-02-27, revenue for 2025 was $2.9 billion, up 18.5% from $2.44 billion in 2024, and operating income rose to $589.32 million from $427.17 million. Management's narrative centers on Connected TV (CTV), which the filing describes as a significant driver of growth, along with expansion across other channels and AI-driven automation of campaigns. Operating cash flow reached $992.72 million in 2025 versus $739.46 million in 2024. No FACT-classified news is on file, so the drivers described here come from the filing text alone.

Hidden risk.The most material tension is client concentration combined with weak contractual lock-in. The 10-K states that two holding companies each represented more than 10% of gross billings for 2025. The 10-Q says master services agreements let clients choose their spend and terminate with limited notice, and the company does not typically have exclusive relationships with clients. Google is both a major advertising inventory supplier and a competitor. The filing also notes that agencies may not pay until their advertisers pay. The forensic scores do not flag manipulation, but these commercial dependencies are where a casual reader could underweight the risk.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what TTD reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
22.4%
of the shares available to trade
Very high
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
84.1M
Change since Aug 31
−4.1%
Days to cover
3.3

What it tells us

Bets against TTD are unusually crowded. If the price rises, short sellers racing to buy shares back can push it higher still. That is called a short squeeze.

Little changed since the Aug 31 report (−4.1%).

At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 3.3 days to buy back every borrowed share.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement

The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) The Trade Desk filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Sep 14, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Sep 4, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 2.05: Restructuring or exit costs
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 6, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 13, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • May 8, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-05-04)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    EDGAR →
  • May 8, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-05-07)Item 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors0
    EDGAR →
  • May 7, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-03-31)Period: 2026-03-310
    EDGAR →
  • May 7, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-05-07)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 9, 2026
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2026-05-04)0
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 27, 2026
    10-K
    Annual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

If this case caught your eye

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Financial Shenanigans

Howard M. Schilit

Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.

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The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

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Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

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