Molson Coors Beverage Company

TAP Consumer Defensive · Beverages - Brewers
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$39.03
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$35.52 — $54.82
-29% from high
Market cap
7.3B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
4.9%
P/E
—
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Oct 16, 2026

Watch.

Molson Coors swung to a $2.14 billion 2025 loss while cutting debt sharply.

Caution Beneish: -3.32Altman Z″: 0.33Piotroski: 5/9
RED DEEP 49 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Beneish M Earnings manipulation
-3.32
Clean
−3.0 threshold −1.78 +1.0
Altman Z″ Bankruptcy proximity
0.33
Distress zone
0 threshold 1.10 / 2.60 4.0
Piotroski F Fundamental health (0–9)
5
Mixed
0 threshold 6+ 9
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

The filings describe a company in transition, and the numbers show the cost of that transition in 2025. Revenue fell 5.1% to $13.04 billion, the company reported a net loss of $2.14 billion after a $1.12 billion profit in 2024, and total equity dropped to $10.23 billion from $13.09 billion. Operating cash flow stayed positive at $1.78 billion, which matters for a company with heavy debt service. The Beneish M-Score of -3.320 is below the -1.78 threshold and is labeled not in the elevated manipulation-risk zone. That is a screening result, not proof that the accounting is clean, but this model does not flag the reported figures for a closer forensic read. The Altman Z-Score, using the Z-double-prime variant, is 0.33, which falls in the distress zone. In plain English, this model blends profitability, leverage and liquidity, and a reading this low signals financial stress by its measure, consistent with the 2025 loss and the drop in equity. The Piotroski F-Score is 5 of 9 computable signals, a middling count on a checklist of profitability, leverage and efficiency tests. The operating cash flow to net income ratio of -0.83 is negative only because net income is negative, so it does not measure cash conversion in a loss year and should be read alongside the dollar figures. Readers may want to look at Note 7 on debt and Note 10 on commitments and contingencies in the 10-Q, which cover the senior notes and the indemnities tied to the sale of Kaiser to FEMSA. The risk factors also flag control by the Pentland and Coors Trust stockholders and the Canadian distribution regulation changes, so the restructuring outcome depends on factors outside management's direct control.

Catalyst.Management's current narrative centers on a reset under a new Chief Executive Officer effective October 1, 2025, an Americas Restructuring Plan meant to place resources closer to the business, and a stated push to become a total beverage company beyond beer. The filings name premiumization, Vizzy Hard Seltzer, flavored malt beverages, spirits and non-alcoholic lines as growth routes. In the first quarter of 2026, the Obligor Group, a subset of the company's consolidated entities, reported net sales of $1,858.5 million and net income of $172.1 million. Capital spending was cut, with $98.1 million incurred versus $130.6 million a year earlier.

Hidden risk.The most material tension sits in the balance sheet. The 10-K shows long-term debt of $3.87 billion at 2025 year-end, down from $6.11 billion in 2024, but the 10-Q shows the Obligor Group carrying $2,365.9 million of current portion of long-term debt and short-term borrowings as of March 31, 2026, against $1,816.6 million of current assets. The 3.0% senior notes due July 2026 fall within that near-term group. Credit ratings are BBB/Stable, Baa1/Stable and BBB/Stable, and the risk factors list credit rating deterioration and debt covenant restrictions. The 2025 operating loss of $2.34 billion also brings the goodwill and intangible impairment risk listed in the filing into focus.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what TAP reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
21.2%
of the shares available to trade
Very high
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
22.9M
Change since Aug 31
−22.4%
Days to cover
4.2

What it tells us

Bets against TAP are unusually crowded. If the price rises, short sellers racing to buy shares back can push it higher still. That is called a short squeeze.

Short sellers closed some of their bets: shares sold short fell 22.4% since the Aug 31 report.

At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 4.2 days to buy back every borrowed share.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement

The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Molson Coors Beverage Company filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Aug 6, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 6, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report0
    EDGAR →
  • May 8, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-05-06)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 30, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-04-30)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 30, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-03-31)Period: 2026-03-310
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 25, 2026
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2026-05-06)0
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 18, 2026
    10-K
    Annual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 18, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-02-18)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings); Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

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Financial Shenanigans

Howard M. Schilit

Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.

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The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

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Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

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