Synopsys, Inc.

SNPS Technology · Software - Infrastructure
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$468.11
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$362.55 — $539.48
-13% from high
Market cap
89.7B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
—
No dividend declared
P/E
82.7
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Oct 16, 2026

Watch.

Synopsys revenue grew 15.1% in fiscal 2025 while net income fell and debt surged.

Caution Beneish: -1.89Altman Z″: 2.63Piotroski: 3/9
RED DEEP 53 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Beneish M Earnings manipulation
-1.89
Elevated
−3.0 threshold −1.78 +1.0
Altman Z″ Bankruptcy proximity
2.63
Safe
0 threshold 1.10 / 2.60 4.0
Piotroski F Fundamental health (0–9)
3
Weak fundamentals
0 threshold 6+ 9
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

The forensic screens in this data point in different directions, so readers should weigh them against the reported figures rather than treat any single one as a verdict. The Beneish M-Score is -1.889, below the -1.78 threshold, so the label places it outside the elevated manipulation-risk zone. That is a screening result, not proof that the reported numbers are accurate, and it does not explain the large balance-sheet change visible in fiscal 2025. The Altman Z″-Score is 2.63, which the label places in the safe zone at 2.60 or above, indicating a lower near-term distress screen on this data. The Piotroski F-Score is 3 of 8 computable signals. It is a checklist of profitability, leverage and efficiency tests, so the three passing signals should be read alongside the net income decline rather than as a sign of overall health. Operating cash flow of $1.52 billion was 1.14 times net income of $1.33 billion, meaning cash generation exceeded accounting profit in fiscal 2025. Total assets rose to $48.22 billion from $13.07 billion, and the forward-looking statements reference the Ansys merger and its expected impact. That merger is the likely driver of the jump in assets and debt, though the data does not isolate its effect. Readers may want to look at the Ansys acquisition accounting and the debt terms in the 10-K notes to see how much of the change is acquired rather than organic.

Catalyst.Management describes continued strength in artificial intelligence and high-performance computing demand, while industrial, automotive and consumer electronics customers have recovered more slowly. Revenue rose to $7.05 billion in fiscal 2025 from $6.13 billion in fiscal 2024, a 15.1% increase, though the prior year was a 53-week period that the filing says affected results. The company is reallocating resources in its Design IP segment toward higher growth opportunities after what it calls underperformance there. Operating cash flow was $1.52 billion in fiscal 2025, up from $1.41 billion. The filing also references the Ansys merger and the Ansys S&A software portfolio, which sits within the Design Automation segment.

Hidden risk.Net income fell to $1.33 billion in fiscal 2025 from $2.26 billion in fiscal 2024, and operating income fell to $914.93 million from $1.36 billion, even as revenue grew. Long-term debt rose to $13.46 billion from $15.6 million a year earlier, and total liabilities rose to $19.9 billion from $4.05 billion. The risk factors also cite customers delaying payments, banks that hold the company's foreign currency and deposit relationships, and export controls that can lengthen transaction cycles. China is described as building government-backed EDA competitors. Readers may want to look at how the debt was structured and how the company intends to service it.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what SNPS reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
2.6%
of the shares available to trade
Low
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
5M
Change since Aug 31
−4.6%
Days to cover
2.5

What it tells us

Few traders are betting against SNPS. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.

Little changed since the Aug 31 report (−4.6%).

At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 2.5 days to buy back every borrowed share.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement

The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Synopsys filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Oct 5, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 8.01: Other events0
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 26, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 26, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report0
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 26, 2026
    8-K/A
    Current report (amended)Item 2.05: Restructuring or exit costs
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 12, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 20, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-04-16)Item 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors; Item 5.07: Shareholder vote results0
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 2, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-03-02)Item 8.01: Other events0
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 25, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-01-31)Period: 2026-01-310
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 25, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-02-25)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings); Item 8.01: Other events0
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 19, 2026
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2026-04-16)0
    EDGAR →
  • Dec 22, 2025
    10-K
    Annual report (2025-10-31)Period: 2025-10-310
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

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