Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd.

RCL Consumer Cyclical · Travel Services
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$280.01
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$222.22 — $356.39
-21% from high
Market cap
74.9B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
2.1%
P/E
17.3
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Oct 16, 2026

Fairly valued.

Higher 2025 profit and cash flow sit beside a distress-zone Altman score.

Neutral Beneish: -2.72Altman Z″: 0.04Piotroski: 7/9
RED DEEP 67 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Beneish M Earnings manipulation
-2.72
Clean
−3.0 threshold −1.78 +1.0
Altman Z″ Bankruptcy proximity
0.04
Distress zone
0 threshold 1.10 / 2.60 4.0
Piotroski F Fundamental health (0–9)
7
Strong
0 threshold 6+ 9
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

Taken together, the filings show a business whose reported earnings and cash generation improved sharply after the 2021 and 2022 period of suspended and partial operations, but whose balance sheet and capital plans carry more weight than the income statement alone suggests. Operating cash flow was $6.46 billion in 2025 against net income of $4.27 billion, a ratio of 1.51 that is a simple calculation from the provided figures. This means cash generation exceeded reported profit, which is consistent with the Cruise Pricing section's description of upfront deposits and balances due before sailing. The Beneish M-Score of -2.718 is not in the elevated manipulation-risk zone, which is a screening result that does not by itself point to earnings manipulation. The Piotroski F-Score is 7 of 7 computable signals, meaning all seven of the financial-health tests the code could compute were passed. The Altman Z"-Score of 0.04 is in the distress zone, and this is the score that deserves the closest attention, because it reflects balance-sheet structure rather than 2025 income. Readers may want to look at how the Celebrity River Cruises commitment for 10 new ships announced in January 2026, the Discovery-class ships contracted for 2029 and 2032, and the Icon-class ship due in 2028 are being financed. Readers may also want to look at the loyalty programs, which have over 28 million enrolled members, and the planned Points Choice program in 2026 as drivers of repeat business. The 2021 comparisons are distorted by the Silversea reporting lag elimination and the Azamara sale, so readers may want to avoid treating the 2021 to 2022 trend as a steady line.

Catalyst.According to the 10-Q excerpt and the 2025 results, the business is currently driven by pricing and capacity. Full-year 2025 revenues were $17.93 billion, up 8.8% from $16.48 billion in 2024, and net income rose to $4.27 billion from $2.88 billion. Occupancy reached 109.7% in 2025 versus 108.5% in 2024, and passengers carried rose to 9,446,010. In the first quarter of 2026, net income attributable to the company was $941 million versus $730 million a year earlier. Management attributes the $453 million quarterly revenue increase primarily to capacity growth and higher pricing. The company operated 69 ships as of December 31, 2025.

Hidden risk.The most material tension is the balance sheet. Liabilities were $31.37 billion against assets of $41.62 billion at December 31, 2025, so liabilities equal about 75% of assets. Equity improved to $10.04 billion from $7.56 billion, yet the Altman Z"-Score of 0.04 falls in the distress zone. That is a screening model result, not a finding by the company, and it should be read alongside the strong income and cash flow figures rather than in isolation. In February 2026 the company issued $1.25 billion of senior notes due 2033, and the filing describes a ship order book of 38,730 berths, so large capital commitments continue. The 10-K excerpt also cross-references cyber security risks without detailing them in the portion provided.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what RCL reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
6.2%
of the shares available to trade
Moderate
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
11.3M
Change since Aug 31
+3.3%
Days to cover
3.6

What it tells us

A noticeable minority of traders is betting that RCL shares will fall.

Little changed since the Aug 31 report (+3.3%).

At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 3.6 days to buy back every borrowed share.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement

The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Royal Caribbean Cruises filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Sep 23, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 8.01: Other events0
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 20, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 1.01: Signed a material agreement; Item 2.03: New debt or other financial obligation
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 7, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 1.01: Signed a material agreement
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 28, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 28, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 20, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors; Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 30, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-03-31)Period: 2026-03-310
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 30, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-04-30)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 17, 2026
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2026-05-28)0
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 27, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-02-27)Item 1.01: Signed a material agreement; Item 2.03: New debt or other financial obligation0
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 17, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-02-10)Item 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors; Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 11, 2026
    10-K
    Annual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

If this case caught your eye

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Financial Shenanigans

Howard M. Schilit

Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.

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The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

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Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

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