Paramount Skydance Corporation

PSKY Communication Services · Entertainment
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$9.78
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$6.63 — $17.29
-43% from high
Market cap
11B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
2.1%
P/E
—
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Oct 16, 2026

Red flags.

Deep 2024 losses, shrinking equity, and a Beneish score in the elevated zone.

Bearish Beneish: -1.08Piotroski: 0/9
RED DEEP 10 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Beneish M Earnings manipulation
-1.08
High manipulation likelihood
−3.0 threshold −1.78 +1.0
Piotroski F Fundamental health (0–9)
0
Weak fundamentals
0 threshold 6+ 9
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

Read together, the data show a company whose reported results have weakened while its strategic bet has grown very large. Revenues were $29.21 billion in 2024 versus $29.65 billion in 2023, but the net loss widened to $6.19 billion from $608 million, and the operating loss widened to $5.27 billion from $451 million. Operating cash flow was positive at $752 million in 2024 and $475 million in 2023, so the cash picture is less severe than the accounting losses. The Beneish M-Score of -1.078 is in the elevated manipulation-risk zone, as labeled in code. Under this framework that is a screening flag calling for a closer read of receivables, accruals and reported margins, not evidence that anything was manipulated. The Altman Z-Score of 0.02 falls in the distress zone, meaning its profile resembles companies under financial strain. The model was not built for this kind of company in the middle of a large transaction, so it is a rough guide, but it still points to strain. The Piotroski F-Score is 0 of 1 computable signals, so it offers almost no information. The 2025 operating cash flow to net income ratio is 0.00, but the underlying 2025 cash flow and net income amounts are not in the data, so that figure cannot be checked here. Equity fell from $23.05 billion to $11.69 billion between 2023 and 2025, a decline of about 49 percent, and total assets fell from $46.17 billion to $43.34 billion in 2025. The 10-Q risk factors tie the Warner Bros. merger to regulatory approvals, a September 30, 2026 date after which additional cash consideration accrues, and a March 4, 2027 End Date. Readers may want to look at Note 14 on legal matters, which is incorporated by reference but is not in the excerpt provided.

Catalyst.According to the Item 1 and Item 7 text, the dominant near-term driver is Paramount's proposed acquisition of Warner Bros. Discovery. Paramount launched a cash tender offer on December 8, 2025 at $30.00 per Warner Bros. share, then on February 24, 2026 proposed $31.00 per share. The company reports commitments for up to $57.5 billion of debt financing and $46.6 billion of equity commitments from Ellison family entities and RedBird Capital Partners affiliates. Its 2025 segments were TV Media, Direct-to-Consumer and Filmed Entertainment. CBS Stations operates 29 owned broadcast television stations. In Q1 2026 the company moved to three segments, with a new Studios segment combining Filmed Entertainment and TV Media studio operations.

Hidden risk.The most material tension is the size of obligations tied to the Warner Bros. deal relative to the balance sheet. The filings describe a regulatory termination fee that was raised to $7.0 billion if the deal fails on regulatory matters, a ticking fee of $0.25 per Warner Bros. share per quarter, and merger costs payable whether or not the deal closes. Equity fell from $23.05 billion at the end of 2023 to $11.69 billion at the end of 2025. The Beneish M-Score of -1.078 is in the elevated manipulation-risk zone, which is a screening flag rather than proof. The score data also lists 2025 revenue growth of -100.0%, which does not fit the annual revenue series provided and should be checked against the 10-K.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what PSKY reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
15.7%
of the shares available to trade
High
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
85M
Change since Aug 14
+8.5%
Days to cover
8.3

What it tells us

A large group of traders is betting that PSKY shares will fall. That is a strong negative view, and also a crowd that would have to buy shares back if the price rises.

Little changed since the Aug 14 report (+8.5%).

Short sellers would need about 8.3 days of normal trading to buy back every borrowed share. A slow exit like that can make a rush to cover sharper.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 15, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Quarterly report

The quarterly report (10-Q) and current reports (8-K) Paramount Skydance filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Oct 13, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 1.01: Signed a material agreement; Item 2.03: New debt or other financial obligation; Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials); Item 8.01: Other events
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Oct 6, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 1.01: Signed a material agreement; Item 1.02: Ended a material agreement; Item 2.01: Completed an acquisition or sale of assets; Item 2.03: New debt or other financial obligation; Item 3.02: Unre
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Oct 6, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Oct 2, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Oct 1, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors; Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials); Item 8.01: Other events
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Sep 30, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 8.01: Other events0
    EDGAR →
  • Sep 28, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Sep 25, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 3.01: Delisting notice or listing transfer; Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 4, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report0
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 4, 2026
    8-K/A
    Current report (amended)Item 8.01: Other events0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 31, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 9.01: Financial Statements and Exhibits0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 23, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 5.07: Shareholder vote results0
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

If this case caught your eye

Affiliate links — Filing.fyi earns a commission on Amazon purchases. We pick the books first, attach the link second.

Financial Shenanigans

Howard M. Schilit

Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.

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The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

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Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

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