Pool Corporation

POOL Industrials · Industrial Distribution
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$169.12
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$152.70 — $305.63
-45% from high
Market cap
6.1B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
3.1%
P/E
15.5
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Oct 16, 2026

Deep value.

Pool's 2025 revenue held nearly flat while operating cash flow fell 44.5% and debt rose.

Bullish Beneish: -2.51Altman Z″: 4.02Piotroski: 5/9
RED DEEP 83 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Beneish M Earnings manipulation
-2.51
Clean
−3.0 threshold −1.78 +1.0
Altman Z″ Bankruptcy proximity
4.02
Safe
0 threshold 1.10 / 2.60 4.0
Piotroski F Fundamental health (0–9)
5
Mixed
0 threshold 6+ 9
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

Pool's filings describe a mature, recurring-revenue distributor whose sales base is more stable than its cash generation in 2025. The Beneish M-Score is -2.509, below the -1.78 threshold, so it is not in the elevated manipulation-risk zone. That is a statistical screen, not proof the accounts are clean, but it does not raise a flag on this measure. The Altman Z″-Score is 4.02, in the safe zone at 2.60 or above, which indicates low modeled distress risk on the balance sheet. It is a statistical model, not a forecast. The Piotroski F-Score is 5 of 9 computable signals, a middling reading that means about half of the computable checks on profitability, leverage and efficiency passed. Operating cash flow to net income of 0.90 shows cash earnings were close to reported earnings in 2025, yet the year-over-year drop in operating cash flow is the largest movement in the annual data. Readers may want to look at the Item 7 MD&A in the 10-K for management's explanation of the operating cash flow decline and the rise in long-term debt. They may also want to review the Item 1A risk factors on consumer financing costs and housing, because the filing links pool construction and remodel timing to those factors. Those explanations are not in the excerpts provided here, so the cash flow question remains open in this analysis.

Catalyst.Management's filings tie the business to recurring demand. In 2025, about 64% of sales came from maintenance and minor repair of existing pools, 22% from remodeling, renovations and upgrades, and 14% from new pool construction. The company operates 456 sales centers in North America, Europe and Australia through five distribution networks: SCP Distributors, Superior Pool Products, Horizon Distributors, National Pool Trends and Sun Wholesale Supply. Revenue was $5.29 billion in 2025 versus $5.31 billion in 2024, a 0.4% decline. The 10-K estimates new in-ground pool construction fell 3% to 5%, to just below 60,000 units from 62,000. Inflationary product cost increases were about 2% to 3% in 2025, including a 1% impact from U.S. tariffs, and are expected to be about 1% to 2% in 2026.

Hidden risk.The gap between earnings and cash is the tension to watch. Net income fell from $434.32 million in 2024 to $406.4 million in 2025, about 6.4%. Operating cash flow fell from $659.19 million to $365.85 million, a decline of about 44.5%. Operating cash flow still equaled 0.90 times net income in 2025, but the drop is steep. Long-term debt rose from $900.88 million to $1.19 billion, while equity slipped from $1.27 billion to $1.19 billion. The 10-Q also states the company cannot assure shareholders that dividends will be declared or paid if the Board sees a better use of funds. The excerpts provided do not explain the cash decline.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what POOL reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
11.9%
of the shares available to trade
High
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
3.6M
Change since Aug 31
+5.4%
Days to cover
4.3

What it tells us

A large group of traders is betting that POOL shares will fall. That is a strong negative view, and also a crowd that would have to buy shares back if the price rises.

Little changed since the Aug 31 report (+5.4%).

At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 4.3 days to buy back every borrowed share.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement

The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Pool Corporation filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Oct 9, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Sep 25, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 28, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 1.01: Signed a material agreement; Item 2.03: New debt or other financial obligation
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 29, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 23, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings); Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • May 4, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-05-04)Item 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors; Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 29, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-04-29)Item 5.07: Shareholder vote results; Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 28, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-03-31)Period: 2026-03-310
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 23, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-04-23)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings); Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 26, 2026
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2025-12-31)0
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 26, 2026
    10-K
    Annual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

If this case caught your eye

Affiliate links — Filing.fyi earns a commission on Amazon purchases. We pick the books first, attach the link second.

Financial Shenanigans

Howard M. Schilit

Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.

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The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

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Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

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