Pfizer Inc.

PFE Healthcare · Drug Manufacturers - General
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$29.44
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$23.62 — $29.88
-1% from high
Market cap
167.8B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
5.8%
P/E
38.7
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Oct 16, 2026

Deep value.

Pfizer's 2025 revenue and profit slipped while long-term debt rose to $61.64 billion.

Bullish Beneish: -2.52
RED DEEP 100 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Beneish M Earnings manipulation
-2.52
Clean
−3.0 threshold −1.78 +1.0
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

The Beneish M-Score for 2025-FY is -2.522, which is below the -1.78 threshold and is labeled not in the elevated zone. In plain English, the model compares several year-over-year ratios, including receivables, gross margin, asset quality, depreciation, sales growth, and accruals, and a reading in this range does not carry the elevated manipulation-risk flag the model is designed to raise. It is a screening output rather than an audit conclusion, and it does not confirm that the reported figures are accurate. The second quality measure, operating cash flow divided by net income, is 1.51 for 2025-FY, meaning operating cash flow of $11.7 billion ran above net income of $7.77 billion. Cash generation exceeding earnings is generally a reassuring sign, but the ratio is lower than the 2024 level implied by the provided figures: $12.74 billion of operating cash flow against $8.03 billion of net income, a ratio of about 1.59. Revenue declined 1.7% to $62.58 billion in 2025, and the longer picture is steeper, with 2022 revenue at $91.79 billion. This synthesis is limited because no MD&A text, no risk-factor text, and no FACT-classified news headlines were on file. The filing's own explanations for the revenue decline, the debt increase, or any specific product, segment, legal matter, or regulatory issue therefore cannot be checked here. Readers may want to look at the MD&A and risk-factor sections of the company's annual report directly, particularly how management describes the drivers of revenue and the reasons for the rise in long-term debt. Those sections would supply the context that the numbers in this data set cannot.

Catalyst.No MD&A text was on file, so this paragraph relies only on reported results and cannot describe management's explanation of what is driving the business. On the reported figures, 2025 revenue was $62.58 billion, down 1.7% from $63.63 billion in 2024. Net income was $7.77 billion versus $8.03 billion, and operating cash flow was $11.7 billion versus $12.74 billion. The multi-year direction is also relevant: revenue was $91.79 billion in 2022 and $50.91 billion in 2023, so the top line has moved substantially from year to year. Net income was $2.12 billion in 2023 and $31.37 billion in 2022, and the 2025 figure sits between those levels.

Hidden risk.The most material item a casual reader could miss is long-term debt rising while equity shrinks. Long-term debt increased from $57.41 billion at the end of 2024 to $61.64 billion at the end of 2025, an increase of about $4.23 billion. Equity declined from $88.2 billion to $86.48 billion over the same period, which puts long-term debt at about 0.71 times equity (61.64 divided by 86.48). Operating cash flow fell from $12.74 billion to $11.7 billion, so the cash available to support that debt declined as the debt rose. Total liabilities did fall, to $121.39 billion from $124.9 billion, so the balance sheet is not weakening on every line. Without risk-factor text on file, the reason for the debt increase cannot be determined from this data.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what PFE reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
2.6%
of the shares available to trade
Low
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
150.2M
Change since Aug 31
−0.9%
Days to cover
4.5

What it tells us

Few traders are betting against PFE. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.

Little changed since the Aug 31 report (−0.9%).

At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 4.5 days to buy back every borrowed share.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Quarterly report

The quarterly report (10-Q) and current report (8-K) Pfizer filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Aug 4, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report0
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 4, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

If this case caught your eye

Affiliate links — Filing.fyi earns a commission on Amazon purchases. We pick the books first, attach the link second.

Financial Shenanigans

Howard M. Schilit

Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.

View on Amazon →

The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

View on Amazon →

Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

View on Amazon →