PepsiCo, Inc.

PEP Consumer Defensive · Beverages - Non-Alcoholic
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$128.38
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$123.47 — $171.48
-25% from high
Market cap
174.9B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
4.6%
P/E
16.1
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Oct 16, 2026

Deep value.

PepsiCo's 2025 revenue rose 2.2% while net income fell to $8.24 billion.

Bullish Beneish: -2.62Altman Z″: 2.88Piotroski: 5/9Fog: 18.0
RED DEEP 82 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Beneish M Earnings manipulation
-2.62
Clean
−3.0 threshold −1.78 +1.0
Altman Z″ Bankruptcy proximity
2.88
Safe
0 threshold 1.10 / 2.60 4.0
Piotroski F Fundamental health (0–9)
5
Mixed
0 threshold 6+ 9
Fog Index MD&A readability
17.98
Dense
8 threshold ≥ 18 = murky 24
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

The most important tension in these filings is between headline revenue growth and weaker earnings. Revenue rose 2.2% in fiscal 2025, but net income fell from $9.58 billion to $8.24 billion, a decline of about 14.0%, and operating income fell about 10.8%. Operating cash flow covered net income at a ratio of 1.47, which is a relatively strong cash conversion figure, but cash flow itself declined. The Beneish M-Score is -2.620, and its label says it is not in the elevated manipulation-risk zone, meaning it sits below the -1.78 threshold. That is a screening result, not a clean bill of health. The Altman Z-Score is 3.22, which its label places in the safe zone above 2.99; because PepsiCo is an operating company rather than a bank or financial firm, that zone is applicable here. The Piotroski F-Score is 5 of 9 computable signals, a middling reading that suggests mixed financial strength. The Fog Index of the MD&A is 17.98, which its label places in the hard-to-read band of 14 to 18, so a careful reader will need extra effort to follow management's explanations. The filings also describe a $10 billion repurchase program and an ongoing global ERP transformation and productivity plan, both of which deserve attention alongside the debt increase. Readers may want to look at the full 10-K Item 7 and Note 9 for the detailed drivers behind the segment results.

Catalyst.The MD&A excerpt provided is from the 10-Q for the 12 weeks ended September 5, 2026, and it covers controls, legal matters and share repurchases rather than a full results discussion, so the annual figures are the main financial data here. For fiscal 2025, revenue reached $93.92 billion, up 2.2% from $91.85 billion in 2024. Operating income, however, declined to $11.5 billion from $12.89 billion. The 10-K business section describes six reportable segments, including PepsiCo Foods North America and PepsiCo Beverages North America, and notes the December 2024 acquisition of the Strauss Group's 50% stake in Sabra Dipping Company. During the 12 weeks ended September 5, 2026, the company repurchased 1.9 million shares under a $10 billion program, leaving $9.251 billion available under that program.

Hidden risk.Long-term debt rose to $42.32 billion at fiscal 2025 year-end from $37.22 billion a year earlier, an increase of about 13.7%, while operating cash flow fell to $12.09 billion from $12.51 billion. The 10-K risk section notes continued volatility in commodity, packaging and other input costs that may continue into fiscal 2026. In the 10-Q, management states that ERP system migrations resulted in changes that materially affected internal control over financial reporting, while concluding these changes did not have an adverse effect. The same 10-Q also states there are no material changes to risk factors. Readers may want to look at how those statements fit together. The Baltimore Matter was appealed on August 18, 2026, and management says the outcome of the listed matters is not expected to have a material adverse effect.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what PEP reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
1.9%
of the shares available to trade
Low
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
23.3M
Change since Aug 31
+9.5%
Days to cover
2.6

What it tells us

Few traders are betting against PEP. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.

Little changed since the Aug 31 report (+9.5%).

At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 2.6 days to buy back every borrowed share.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement

The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statements (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) PepsiCo filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Oct 8, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-10-08)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Oct 8, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-09-05)Period: 2026-09-050
    EDGAR →
  • Sep 17, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-09-17)No specific items found in 8-K.
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 9, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-07-09)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 8, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report0
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 27, 2026
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2026-05-06)0
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 11, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-02-11)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 3, 2026
    10-K
    Annual report (2025-12-27)Period: 2025-12-270
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 3, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-02-03)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Dec 15, 2025
    8-K
    Current report (2025-12-15)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    EDGAR →
  • Oct 9, 2025
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2025-09-06)Period: 2025-09-060
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 28, 2025
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2025-05-07)0
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

If this case caught your eye

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Financial Shenanigans

Howard M. Schilit

Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.

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The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

View on Amazon →

Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

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