ONEOK, Inc.

OKE Energy · Oil & Gas Midstream
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$90.65
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$64.02 — $99.85
-9% from high
Market cap
57.1B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
4.7%
P/E
15.7
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Oct 16, 2026

Fairly valued.

Acquisitions appear central to OKE's 55% revenue jump; leverage and Altman distress reading need scrutiny.

Neutral Beneish: -2.03Altman Z″: 1.04Piotroski: 7/9Fog: 16.2
RED DEEP 60 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Beneish M Earnings manipulation
-2.03
Elevated
−3.0 threshold −1.78 +1.0
Altman Z″ Bankruptcy proximity
1.04
Distress zone
0 threshold 1.10 / 2.60 4.0
Piotroski F Fundamental health (0–9)
7
Strong
0 threshold 6+ 9
Fog Index MD&A readability
16.24
Dense
8 threshold ≥ 18 = murky 24
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

The scores point in different directions, so no single score settles the question. The Beneish M-Score is -2.032, below the -1.78 threshold and therefore not in the elevated manipulation-risk zone. It is a statistical screen built from receivables, margins, asset quality, depreciation, leverage and accruals, and a non-elevated reading is not a clean bill of health. The Altman Z″-Score is 1.04, in the distress zone. It blends working capital, retained earnings, operating profitability, equity relative to liabilities and asset turnover. For a company carrying roughly $30.75 billion of long-term debt, it signals balance-sheet pressure the screen is designed to flag, not a forecast of default. The Piotroski F-Score is 7 of 8 computable signals, a checklist of profitability, leverage and efficiency tests, and the company passed most of the tests it could be scored on. The Fog Index of 16.24 falls in the hard-to-read band, meaning the MD&A requires college-level reading. The operating cash flow to net income ratio of 1.65 means cash generation ran ahead of accounting profit in 2025. The profit picture is more mixed than revenue growth suggests. Operating margin fell from about 23.0% in 2024 to about 17.1% in 2025, and net margin fell from about 14.0% to about 10.1%. The 10-Q excerpt contains exhibits and certifications rather than Q1 2026 financial statements, so the most recent quarter cannot be assessed from this data. Readers may want to look at Note B on acquisition accounting, Note G on debt, and Note R on segments in the 10-K, where the EnLink and Medallion effects can be traced.

Catalyst.The 2025 results reflect a larger consolidated footprint. Revenues rose to $33.63 billion from $21.7 billion, and operating income reached $5.74 billion versus $4.99 billion in 2024, a 15.0% increase. The Executive Summary ties the scale-up to the EnLink Acquisition, completed January 31, 2025, in which ONEOK issued 41 million shares with a fair value of $4.0 billion. Other 2025 deals named in the filing include the Delaware Basin JV Acquisition (May 28, 2025) and the BridgeTex Additional Interest Acquisition (July 22, 2025). The excerpted MD&A text does not break out organic growth, so the share of the increase from acquisitions versus existing operations cannot be quantified from this data.

Hidden risk.Leverage is the tension a casual reader could miss. Long-term debt was $30.75 billion at December 31, 2025, against equity of $22.48 billion, a debt-to-equity ratio of about 1.37. At December 31, 2024, the figures were $31.02 billion against $17.04 billion, about 1.82. The Altman Z″-Score of 1.04 sits in the distress zone. That label is a screening output for a capital-intensive company with heavy borrowing, not a prediction of default. Debt instruments named in the filing include the $3.5 Billion Credit Agreement, the $120 million Guardian Term Loan Agreement, and the $60 million Viking Term Loan Agreement. The Fog Index of 16.24 is in the hard-to-read band, which may make the MD&A harder to check against the numbers.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what OKE reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
4.4%
of the shares available to trade
Low
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
24.4M
Change since Aug 31
−6.2%
Days to cover
6.3

What it tells us

Few traders are betting against OKE. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.

Little changed since the Aug 31 report (−6.2%).

Short sellers would need about 6.3 days of normal trading to buy back every borrowed share. A slow exit like that can make a rush to cover sharper.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement

The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) ONEOK filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Sep 15, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 1.01: Signed a material agreement; Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Sep 10, 2026
    8-K12B
    Current report (successor company)
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 31, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 1.01: Signed a material agreement; Item 3.02: Unregistered sale of shares; Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials); Item 8.01: Other events
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 4, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report0
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 3, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 2.01: Completed an acquisition or sale of assets; Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 29, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-03-31)Period: 2026-03-310
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 28, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-04-28)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings); Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 1, 2026
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2026-05-20)0
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 25, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-03-20)Item 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors0
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 24, 2026
    10-K
    Annual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 23, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-02-23)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings); Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

If this case caught your eye

Affiliate links — Filing.fyi earns a commission on Amazon purchases. We pick the books first, attach the link second.

Financial Shenanigans

Howard M. Schilit

Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.

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The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

View on Amazon →

Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

View on Amazon →