Newmont Corporation

NEM Basic Materials · Gold
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$115.79
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$76.05 — $135.29
-14% from high
Market cap
122B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
0.9%
P/E
14.6
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Oct 16, 2026

Deep value.

Higher gold prices and asset sales drove Newmont's 2025 profit as output declined.

Bullish Beneish: -2.62Piotroski: 8/9
RED DEEP 100 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Beneish M Earnings manipulation
-2.62
Clean
−3.0 threshold −1.78 +1.0
Piotroski F Fundamental health (0–9)
8
Strong
0 threshold 6+ 9
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

The forensic scores point in a more reassuring direction than the headline earnings swing alone might suggest, but they measure accounting patterns, not business quality. The Beneish M-Score is -2.625, which is below -1.78 and therefore not in the elevated manipulation-risk zone; this is a screening result, not proof that the numbers are clean. The Piotroski F-Score is 8 of 8 computable signals, meaning every signal that could be computed was favorable; these signals cover profitability, leverage, liquidity, and operating efficiency. The operating cash flow to net income ratio of 1.46 means cash generated by operations of $10.33 billion exceeded reported net income of $7.08 billion by roughly 46 percent, which supports the quality of the earnings. The Altman Z-double-prime score and the Fog Index are not in the data for this analysis, so no reading is given for either. Balance sheet trends are mixed: equity rose to $33.87 billion from $29.93 billion, and long-term debt fell after the redemption of $3.4 billion of senior notes, while liabilities of $23.08 billion remain sizable. The project pipeline discussion, which includes Tanami Expansion 2, Cerro Negro District Expansion 1, Cadia Panel Caves, Lihir Nearshore Barrier, Red Chris Block Cave and Wafi-Golpu, states that permitting, community support, engineering availability and costs could change the timing and cost of these projects. Readers may want to look at the Item 7A commodity price exposure section and the 10-K critical accounting estimates to see how the company sets its long-term metal price assumptions and how it values provisional concentrate sales.

Catalyst.Higher realized gold prices are the main driver. Realized gold averaged $3,498 per ounce in 2025 versus $2,408 in 2024, and Sales rose to $22.67 billion from $18.68 billion, a 21.3% increase. Management attributes the rise in net income from continuing operations attributable to Newmont stockholders to higher gold prices, a net gain on completed divestments, and lower costs applicable to sales from divested sites. Operating cash flow reached $10.33 billion, up 64% from the prior year, and free cash flow was $7.3 billion. Portfolio changes are reshaping the base: Ahafo North reached commercial production, while the CC&V, Musselwhite, Éléonore, Akyem, and Porcupine reportable segments were sold.

Hidden risk.The 2025 earnings lift is partly portfolio-driven rather than purely operational. Attributable gold production fell about 14% to roughly 6 million ounces, largely because of divestments, and the filing cites Impairment charges, primarily at Yanacocha, along with higher income and mining tax expense. Newmont does not hold instruments designed to hedge metal prices. The Item 3 table pairs a short-term gold price assumption of $4,873 per ounce with a long-term assumption of $2,500 per ounce, and the filing warns that falling metal prices could require write-downs to net realizable value. Long-term debt fell to $5.12 billion from $7.55 billion, but total liabilities remained $23.08 billion at year-end 2025.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what NEM reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
1.8%
of the shares available to trade
Low
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
16M
Change since Aug 31
−6.7%
Days to cover
2.2

What it tells us

Few traders are betting against NEM. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.

Little changed since the Aug 31 report (−6.7%).

At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 2.2 days to buy back every borrowed share.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement

The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Newmont filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Aug 20, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 13, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 1.01: Signed a material agreement; Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 23, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 23, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 28, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-04-24)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 23, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-04-23)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 23, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-03-31)Period: 2026-03-310
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 26, 2026
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2026-05-12)0
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 19, 2026
    10-K
    Annual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 19, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-02-19)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

If this case caught your eye

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Financial Shenanigans

Howard M. Schilit

Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.

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The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

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Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

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