Nordson Corporation
NDSN Industrials · Specialty Industrial MachineryDeep value.
Operating cash flow jumped in 2025 as debt fell; tariff and currency exposure stay material.
The four readings.
What the filing actually says.
Taken together, the reported figures look stronger than the narrative excerpt, which contains little results discussion. Long-term debt fell to $1.68 billion from $2.1 billion, while equity rose to $3.04 billion from $2.93 billion and total assets edged down to $5.92 billion from $6 billion. The Altman Z-Score (Z-double-prime variant) is 4.99, which the data places in the safe zone; because Nordson is an industrial manufacturer rather than a bank, that zone reading applies on its face. The Beneish M-Score is -2.545, below -1.78 and labeled not in the elevated manipulation-risk zone, so this screen does not flag elevated risk, although a screening score is not proof either way. The Piotroski F-Score is 7 of 8 computable signals, a checklist of pass-or-fail tests on profitability, leverage and operating efficiency, and that count is favorable. Operating cash flow was 1.48 times net income for 2025, meaning cash generation exceeded reported earnings; the data does not break down what drove that gap. Management reported that disclosure controls were effective as of January 31, 2026, and that internal control over financial reporting had no material changes in the quarter. One disclosure item deserves a closer read: the 10-Q corrects an earlier filing that stated a 40,000-share figure for a terminated CEO trading plan, now given as 41,800 shares. The legal proceedings item refers readers only to the contingencies note, so readers may want to look there for the specifics of any matters.
Catalyst.The provided MD&A excerpt is mostly forward-looking-statement boilerplate, so the clearest drivers come from the reported numbers. Fiscal 2025 revenue rose 3.8% to $2.79 billion from $2.69 billion, and operating cash flow climbed to $719.17 million from $556.19 million, an increase of about 29%. Net income grew more modestly, to $484.47 million from $467.28 million. In the three months ended January 31, 2026, the company repurchased 350,602 shares at an average price of $241.69, and its filings state that the buyback is funded by operating cash and borrowings under credit facilities. The company also entered an Amended and Restated Credit Agreement dated January 30, 2026.
Hidden risk.The most material tension is exposure to trade policy and currency. The 10-K states that about 67 percent of 2025 revenue came from outside the United States, and the risk factors name tariffs on Canada, China and Mexico, plus currency swings in the euro, yen, pound and yuan, as possible drivers of sales, margins and profitability. The 10-Q says there were no material changes to these risk factors. Readers may also want to look at the buyback: the company says it draws on borrowings under its credit facilities, so debt reduction and strong operating cash flow do not tell the whole funding story.
What traders are betting.
The metric
Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.
- Shares sold short
- 1.4M
- Change since Aug 31
- −10.2%
- Days to cover
- 4.0
What it tells us
Few traders are betting against NDSN. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.
Short sellers closed some of their bets: shares sold short fell 10.2% since the Aug 31 report.
At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 4.0 days to buy back every borrowed share.
How investors use it
- Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
- Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
- Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
- Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.
Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement
The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Nordson filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.
- Aug 20, 202610-QQuarterly report0EDGAR →
- Aug 19, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings); Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0EDGAR →
- Mar 4, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-03-02)Item 5.07: Shareholder vote results0EDGAR →
- Feb 19, 202610-QQuarterly report (2026-01-31)Period: 2026-01-310EDGAR →
- Feb 18, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-02-18)Item 9.01 Financial Statements and Exhibits . (d) Exhibits. 99.1 Press release of Nordson Corporation dated February 18, 2026 . 104 Cover Page Interactive Data 0EDGAR →
- Feb 2, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-01-30)Item 1.01: Signed a material agreement; Item 2.03: New debt or other financial obligation0EDGAR →
- Jan 16, 2026DEF 14AProxy statement (2026-03-02)0EDGAR →
- Dec 17, 202510-KAnnual report (2025-10-31)Period: 2025-10-310EDGAR →
If this case caught your eye
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Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.
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