Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings Ltd.

NCLH Consumer Cyclical · Travel Services
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$15.39
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$13.63 — $25.13
-39% from high
Market cap
7.1B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
—
No dividend declared
P/E
9.5
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Oct 16, 2026

Red flags.

Q1 2026 profit returned, but soft bookings and a distress-zone Altman score warrant close reading.

Bearish Beneish: -2.79Altman Z″: -1.48Piotroski: 4/9
RED DEEP 35 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Beneish M Earnings manipulation
-2.79
Clean
−3.0 threshold −1.78 +1.0
Altman Z″ Bankruptcy proximity
-1.48
Distress zone
0 threshold 1.10 / 2.60 4.0
Piotroski F Fundamental health (0–9)
4
Mixed
0 threshold 6+ 9
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

The forensic scores present a split picture that readers may want to look at closely. The Beneish M-Score is -2.793, which is below the -1.78 threshold and is labeled not in the elevated zone. In plain terms, this model does not flag the reported financials for a closer manipulation read, but it is a screening tool, not an audit, and it cannot confirm that every accounting judgment is sound. The Altman Z-Score is -1.48, below 1.10, which places it in the distress zone. For a cruise operator that just reported positive net income, this reading mainly reflects the balance sheet: total liabilities of $20.33 billion against assets of $22.54 billion at year-end 2025, leaving equity of $2.21 billion. That leverage is the core concern, and it lines up with the filing's discussion of refinancing, near-term debt amortization, and maintenance covenants. The Piotroski F-Score is 4 of 5 computable signals, meaning four of the five signals that could be computed passed. It is a checklist of profitability, leverage, and efficiency tests, not a grade on the company. Operating cash flow of $2.09 billion against 2025 net income of $423.25 million gives a ratio of 4.94, which shows that reported earnings are backed by substantial cash generation. Taken together, the scores suggest the reported numbers hang together while the capital structure remains strained. Management describes the fleet and cost programs as long-term, with benefits expected to materialize gradually. The near-term tests are whether bookings return to the optimal range and whether the $125 million savings target becomes visible in quarterly results.

Catalyst.Management attributes the near-term picture to fleet and cost actions as much as to demand. In the quarter ended March 31, 2026, total revenue rose 9.6% to $2.3 billion, and operating income was $232.9 million versus $200.9 million a year earlier. Occupancy reached 103.8% against 101.5%, and Adjusted EBITDA improved 17.6% to $532.9 million. The MD&A cites a target of $125 million in annual savings within marketing, general and administrative expense. Its fleet optimization strategy includes 10-year bareboat charters for Norwegian Sky and Norwegian Sun, a nine-year charter for Seven Seas Navigator, and a refurbishment of Oceania Nautica to be renamed Aurelia in late 2027.

Hidden risk.The quarter's GAAP profit is partly a currency story. Other income of $40.7 million, primarily foreign currency remeasurement gains on euro-denominated debt, sits inside the $104.7 million net income figure. Management's own reconciliation removes a $37.6 million euro-debt FX adjustment when computing Adjusted Net Income. The MD&A also says bookings remain below the company's optimal range after execution missteps, and it notes unhedged exposure to the euro and to customer deposit currencies. Debt is large: the 2030 0.750% exchangeable notes total $1,407.0 million, issued September 11, 2025, and the Revolving Loan Facility is approximately $2.5 billion. Readers may want to look at how the exchangeable notes could dilute existing shareholders, as the forward-looking statements warn.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what NCLH reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
23.9%
of the shares available to trade
Very high
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
96.8M
Change since Aug 31
+12.0%
Days to cover
5.1

What it tells us

Bets against NCLH are unusually crowded. If the price rises, short sellers racing to buy shares back can push it higher still. That is called a short squeeze.

Short sellers added to their bets: shares sold short grew 12.0% since the Aug 31 report.

Short sellers would need about 5.1 days of normal trading to buy back every borrowed share. A slow exit like that can make a rush to cover sharper.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement

The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Norwegian Cruise Line filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Oct 15, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 1.01: Signed a material agreement; Item 1.02: Ended a material agreement; Item 2.03: New debt or other financial obligation; Item 8.01: Other events0
    EDGAR →
  • Sep 30, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 12, 2026
    8-K/A
    Current report (amended)Item 5.07: Shareholder vote results0
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 3, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 30, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • May 4, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-03-31)Period: 2026-03-310
    EDGAR →
  • May 4, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-05-04)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 30, 2026
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2026-06-11)0
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 27, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-03-26)Item 1.01: Signed a material agreement; Item 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors; Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 27, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-03-26)Item 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors0
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 2, 2026
    10-K
    Annual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

If this case caught your eye

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Financial Shenanigans

Howard M. Schilit

Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.

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The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

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Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

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