Micron Technology, Inc.

MU Technology · Semiconductors
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$931.24
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$192.40 — $1,255.00
-26% from high
Market cap
1.1T
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
0.1%
P/E
12.5
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Oct 16, 2026

Deep value.

Micron's revenue rose 256% on AI-driven memory pricing; its Beneish score flags elevated risk.

Bullish Beneish: -0.18Altman Z″: 10.26Piotroski: 9/9Fog: 18.4
RED DEEP 75 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Beneish M Earnings manipulation
-0.18
High manipulation likelihood
−3.0 threshold −1.78 +1.0
Altman Z″ Bankruptcy proximity
10.26
Safe
0 threshold 1.10 / 2.60 4.0
Piotroski F Fundamental health (0–9)
9
Strong
0 threshold 6+ 9
Fog Index MD&A readability
18.35
Obfuscatory prose
8 threshold ≥ 18 = murky 24
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

Micron's four forensic readings point in different directions, and the overall picture depends on which one a reader weighs most. The Piotroski F-Score is 9 of 9 computable signals, meaning every signal the data could compute passed; these are simple yes-or-no tests of profitability, leverage, liquidity and operating efficiency. The Altman Z-Score of 15.12 sits in the safe zone, a statistical measure of bankruptcy risk that does not signal distress at this level. The Beneish M-Score of -0.181 is above the -1.78 threshold, placing it in the elevated manipulation-risk zone. In plain English, that is a screening flag that calls for a closer read of receivables, margins and accruals, not evidence of manipulation. The Fog Index of 18.35 places the MD&A in the very hard to read band, so the discussion of supply allocation and strategic agreements takes effort to parse. Operating cash flow of $89.67 billion against net income of $84.97 billion gives a ratio of 1.06, which supports the reported earnings. Balance-sheet changes are large: total liabilities rose from $28.63 billion to $57.51 billion, while long-term debt fell from $11.53 billion to $2.79 billion. Readers may want to look at the debt footnotes to understand that shift. Management also reports SG&A up 62% and R&D up 49%. The filing describes a cyclical industry in which fiscal 2023 produced a net loss of $5.83 billion on $15.54 billion of revenue, so current margins are a peak-pricing picture to be weighed against that history.

Catalyst.Fiscal 2026 revenue reached $133.19 billion, up 256.3% from $37.38 billion, according to the MD&A, which attributes the gain to AI-driven demand for DRAM and NAND outpacing industry supply. DRAM sales rose 252% on an approximate 180% increase in average selling prices, and NAND sales rose 274% on an approximate 200% rise in prices. Consolidated gross margin improved to 81% from 40%. Management also points to strategic customer agreements signed in the third and fourth quarters of 2026, structured as take-or-pay contracts with binding volume commitments and pricing bands, which it says provide contracted supply and greater pricing visibility. CMBU revenue reached $43.09 billion and CDBU $37.59 billion.

Hidden risk.The most material tension is the Beneish M-Score of -0.181, which falls in the elevated manipulation-risk zone because it sits above the -1.78 threshold. This is a screening flag, not proof of wrongdoing, but it deserves a closer read against a headline that looks this strong. The MD&A itself notes that supply allocation decisions may affect certain customers and end markets, and MCBU bit shipments fell as supply was redirected. The strategic agreements carry binding take-or-pay volumes, so the business commits to delivery regardless of later demand. Fiscal 2023 showed a net loss of $5.83 billion, a reminder that memory pricing has reversed before. The Fog Index of 18.35 means the MD&A is very hard to read, which can hide these nuances from casual readers.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what MU reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
2.3%
of the shares available to trade
Low
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
26M
Change since Aug 31
−12.4%
Days to cover
1.0

What it tells us

Few traders are betting against MU. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.

Short sellers closed some of their bets: shares sold short fell 12.4% since the Aug 31 report.

At normal trading volume, short sellers could buy back every borrowed share in under two days.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Annual reports, quarterly reports & proxy statement

The annual reports (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Micron Technology filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Oct 9, 2026
    10-K
    Annual report (2026-09-03)Period: 2026-09-030
    EDGAR →
  • Sep 30, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-09-30)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 26, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-08-24)No specific items found in 8-K.
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Jun 25, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-05-28)Period: 2026-05-280
    EDGAR →
  • Jun 24, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-06-24)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 1, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-03-31)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 25, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-03-25)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 19, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-02-26)Period: 2026-02-260
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 18, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-03-18)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Nov 25, 2025
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2026-01-15)0
    EDGAR →
  • Oct 3, 2025
    10-K
    Annual report (2025-08-28)Period: 2025-08-280
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

If this case caught your eye

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Financial Shenanigans

Howard M. Schilit

Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.

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The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

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Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

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