MGM Resorts International

MGM Consumer Cyclical · Resorts & Casinos
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$29.48
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$28.72 — $51.59
-43% from high
Market cap
7.5B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
—
No dividend declared
P/E
18.2
Trailing
Verdict status · Oct 16, 2026

Not yet scored

Filing.fyi has not computed forensic scores for MGM yet. Scores appear after the company's next data refresh.

No verdict yet
RED DEEP Scores pending shown after the next data refresh
Composite Health
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

The filings show a company whose top line is growing while its earnings have narrowed. Full year 2025 net income was $205.86 million, compared with $746.56 million in 2024, a decline of about 72%. Operating income was about $1 billion, compared with $1.49 billion, a decline of about 33%. Over the longer period, operating income was $3.94 billion in 2019 and a loss of $642.43 million in 2020, so results have been volatile. The Q1 2026 segment data shows the pressure is uneven. Las Vegas Strip Resorts' Adjusted EBITDAR margin fell to 34.4% from 37.3%, and Regional Operations fell to 28.3% from 31.0%. MGM China's margin fell to 24.4% from 27.8%, mainly because of a $23 million increase in an intercompany branding license fee under a new long-term branding agreement. MGM China also depends heavily on main floor gaming, which the risk factors describe as the expected primary growth source, and faces competition from five other concessionaires in Macau. Foreign currency results add volatility: Q1 2025 included a $101 million loss on USD-denominated debt held by a foreign subsidiary, while Q1 2026 included a $25 million gain. No forensic scores (Beneish M-Score, Piotroski F-Score, Altman Z-Score, or Fog Index) are included in the data used for this synthesis, so none are interpreted here. For context, a Beneish M-Score estimates manipulation risk from accounting ratios, a Piotroski F-Score counts financial-health signals, an Altman Z-Score estimates bankruptcy risk and is unreliable for banks, and the Fog Index measures how hard a document is to read. Readers may want to look at the 10-K's balance sheet and cash flow statements, which were not in this data, to test how the lease obligations and the Japan and BetMGM commitments are funded.

Catalyst.Revenue is growing, led by segments outside the Las Vegas Strip. In the three months ended March 31, 2026, consolidated net revenues rose 4% to $4.45 billion from $4.28 billion. MGM China rose 9%, MGM Digital rose 43% on growth in LeoVegas' business-to-consumer offerings, and Regional Operations rose 2%, while Las Vegas Strip Resorts was flat. For full year 2025, revenues reached $17.54 billion, up from $17.24 billion in 2024. Management's stated growth priorities include the planned integrated resort in Osaka, Japan, expansion of BetMGM North America Venture, and international digital opportunities. In April 2026, the company completed the sale of the operations of MGM Northfield Park for $546 million in cash.

Hidden risk.The gap between revenue growth and profit is the tension a casual reader could miss. Q1 2026 operating income fell 22% to $301.2 million, and net income fell to $174.8 million from $226.7 million, even as revenue rose. Management attributes this to higher gaming taxes at MGM China, a $46 million increase in self-insurance expense from higher reserves, and lower business interruption insurance proceeds ($8 million versus $49 million a year earlier, tied to the September 2023 cybersecurity issue). Those proceeds are one-time recoveries, so the prior-year comparison is flattered. Corporate and other carries triple net lease rent of $565 million for the quarter. The $53 million annual cash rent reduction tied to the Northfield sale offsets only part of this fixed obligation.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what MGM reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
15.9%
of the shares available to trade
High
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
19M
Change since Aug 31
+0.7%
Days to cover
4.3

What it tells us

A large group of traders is betting that MGM shares will fall. That is a strong negative view, and also a crowd that would have to buy shares back if the price rises.

Little changed since the Aug 31 report (+0.7%).

At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 4.3 days to buy back every borrowed share.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement

The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) MGM Resorts International filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Jul 29, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 29, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 29, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-03-31)Period: 2026-03-310
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 29, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-04-29)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 7, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-04-03)Item 1.01: Signed a material agreement0
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 27, 2026
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2026-05-06)0
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 11, 2026
    10-K
    Annual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 5, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-02-05)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

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Financial Shenanigans

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The Interpretation of Financial Statements

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The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

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Quality of Earnings

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Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

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