Marriott International, Inc.
MAR Consumer Cyclical · LodgingNot yet scored
Filing.fyi has not computed forensic scores for MAR yet. Scores appear after the company's next data refresh.
What the filing actually says.
Marriott's filings describe a business built on franchising, management, and licensing rather than property ownership. The risk factors state that the company 'own[s] very few of our lodging properties,' so its results depend on fees from hotel owners and on its Loyalty Program, direct digital channels, and co-branded credit cards. The risk factors identify several pressure points: premature termination of owner agreements, which can lead to costly damage claims that may be hard to collect; disputes with owners over costs and capital spending; bookings shifting to Internet travel intermediaries; and AI tools that could change how travelers book and erode brand loyalty. The 2025 annual figures show revenue in 2020 at $10.57 billion, about 49.6% below the $20.97 billion of 2019, which illustrates how sharply the pandemic risk described in the filings can affect results. Legal matters are referenced through Note 5 and debt through Note 6, but those notes are not included in the data, so this review does not characterize them. The 10-Q reports 2.1 million shares repurchased in the first quarter of 2026 and 24.5 million shares remaining under the authorization. Item 6 notes that certain long-term debt instruments are not filed because each is under 10% of total assets. Management concluded its disclosure controls were effective and reported no changes in internal control over financial reporting. No forensic scores (Beneish M-Score, Piotroski F-Score, Altman Z-Score, or Fog Index) are on file for this review, so none are interpreted here. Readers may want to look at those screens directly in the source filings before drawing conclusions.
Catalyst.Per the annual figures in the data, Marriott's revenues rose to $26.19 billion in 2025 from $25.1 billion in 2024, an increase of about 4.3%. Operating income grew faster, to $4.14 billion from $3.77 billion, roughly 9.8% higher, and net income reached $2.6 billion versus $2.38 billion. The 2026 first-quarter 10-Q MD&A in the data is largely a cross-reference to the 2025 10-K. It states no material changes to critical accounting policies or market risk exposure, so it does not supply quarterly results or a new growth narrative.
Hidden risk.The most useful tension is between 2024 and 2023. Net income fell to $2.38 billion from $3.08 billion, a drop of about 22.7%, while operating income slipped only from $3.86 billion to $3.77 billion. A casual reader could miss that the gap between operating income and net income widened sharply that year. The filings provided do not explain the cause, so readers may want to look at the income statement and notes in the 10-K. The risk factors also say disagreements with hotel owners have increased 'during periods when hotel returns are weaker,' and that intermediary contracts, which generally run two to three years, could renew on less favorable terms.
What traders are betting.
The metric
Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.
- Shares sold short
- 6.7M
- Change since Aug 31
- −4.3%
- Days to cover
- 4.2
What it tells us
Few traders are betting against MAR. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.
Little changed since the Aug 31 report (−4.3%).
At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 4.2 days to buy back every borrowed share.
How investors use it
- Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
- Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
- Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
- Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.
Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement
The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Marriott International filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.
- Sep 24, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 1.01: Signed a material agreement; Item 2.03: New debt or other financial obligationEDGAR →★ Curriculum-relevant
- Aug 13, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 8.01: Other events0EDGAR →
- Aug 3, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0EDGAR →
- Aug 3, 202610-QQuarterly report0EDGAR →
- May 6, 202610-QQuarterly report (2026-03-31)Period: 2026-03-310EDGAR →
- May 6, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-05-06)No specific items found in 8-K.0EDGAR →
- Mar 27, 2026DEF 14AProxy statement (2026-05-08)0EDGAR →
- Feb 20, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-02-18)No specific items found in 8-K.0EDGAR →
- Feb 10, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-02-10)No specific items found in 8-K.0EDGAR →
- Feb 10, 202610-KAnnual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310EDGAR →
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