Mastercard Incorporated

MA Financial Services · Credit Services
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$509.64
Jun 29, 2026
52-week range
$464.52 — $601.77
-15% from high
Market cap
450.3B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
70.0%
P/E
29.5
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Jun 29, 2026

Deep value.

Deep Value (Bullish) — Filing.fyi's reading derived from the latest 10-K and forensic scores.

Bullish Beneish: -2.53Altman Z″: 9.81
RED DEEP 100 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Beneish M Earnings manipulation
-2.53
Clean
−3.0 threshold −1.78 +1.0
Altman Z″ Bankruptcy proximity
9.81
Safe
0 threshold 1.10 / 2.60 4.0
AI synthesis · grounded in this ticker's SEC filings · drag to highlight, releases the composer

What the filing actually says.

AI · wry-editorial preset

Mastercard’s 2025 10-K presents a picture of financial stability, at least as indicated by its core forensic metrics. The Altman Z″ — a 1968 bankruptcy-distress index — registers a robust 9.81, placing the company firmly in the “safe” category, well above the 2.60 threshold that typically separates healthy firms from those in the “grey zone” or distress. This strong figure aligns with the company’s self-description as a technology company in the global payments industry, suggesting operational resilience and a low probability of financial default based on this model. The filing’s Item 7, Management’s Discussion and Analysis, begins with procedural instructions, emphasizing the need to read the discussion “in conjunction with the consolidated financial statements and notes” for a complete understanding. Such an introduction sets a formal tone, reminding readers that financial analysis is less about intuition and more about diligent cross-referencing to the audited statements.

The Beneish M-Score, Beneish’s 1999 eight-ratio earnings-manipulation detector, stands at -2.5341. This value is well below the -1.78 threshold, indicating no elevated risk of earnings manipulation based on the model’s eight financial ratios, which scrutinize factors like receivables growth, gross margin trends, and asset quality. While the Piotroski F-Score, a 9-point fundamental strength scan, and the Fog Index — readability score; 12 = newspaper, 18+ = obfuscatory — are not available from the provided data, the existing metrics suggest a company whose reported financials do not trigger common forensic alarms. The combined signal from Altman and Beneish points to a low probability of financial distress or aggressive accounting practices, offering a quantitative affirmation of stability from these widely-cited academic models.

A notable aspect of the Item 7 MD&A is its instruction regarding comparative financial discussions. For the “results of operations for the year ended December 31, 2024 compared to the year ended December 31, 2023,” the filing directs readers to Part II, Item 7 of our Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2024. This practice means a complete understanding of year-over-year performance trends requires consulting a prior filing, rather than having all relevant comparative data consolidated within the current document. Such cross-referencing, while permissible, adds an additional step for shareholders seeking a comprehensive financial overview, requiring them to juggle multiple reports to piece together a full narrative of the company’s recent operational trajectory. This approach, while efficient for the issuer, places the onus on the reader to synthesize information across different reporting periods, potentially obscuring immediate trends for those who do not consult the referenced document.

This filing, therefore, provides a snapshot of Mastercard’s financial health as reflected in its strong forensic scores and a high-level business description. It confirms the absence of immediate red flags from the available quantitative models, suggesting a stable financial footing based on the provided data. However, the absence of specific risk factor excerpts and the MD&A’s deferral of certain comparative discussions limit the depth of insight into potential operational challenges or detailed year-over-year performance shifts within this single document. Whether MA is “fairly-valued” or otherwise remains a question beyond the scope of this filing’s explicit disclosures, requiring broader market and industry analysis, alongside a diligent review of the referenced prior reports to form a complete picture.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Filing timeline

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  • Feb 11, 2026
    10-K
    Annual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310
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  • Feb 5, 2026
    8-K
    Material event (2026-02-02)### Item 5.02 Departure of Directors or Certain Officers; Election of Directors; Appointment of Certain Officers; Compensatory Arrangements of Certain Officers 0
    Read →
  • Jan 29, 2026
    8-K
    Material event (2026-01-29)### Item 2.02 Results of Operations and Financial Condition On January 29, 2026, Mastercard Incorporated issued an earnings release announcing financial results0
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  • Nov 12, 2025
    8-K
    Material event (2025-11-07)### Item 1.01 Entry into a Material Definitive Agreement On November 7, 2025, Mastercard Incorporated (the “Company”) entered into a committed five-year unsecur0
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  • Oct 30, 2025
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2025-09-30)Period: 2025-09-300
    Read →
  • Apr 28, 2025
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2025-06-24)0
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Further reading · curated for this filing

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