Las Vegas Sands Corp.
LVS Consumer Cyclical · Resorts & CasinosNot yet scored
Filing.fyi has not computed forensic scores for LVS yet. Scores appear after the company's next data refresh.
What the filing actually says.
The filings show a sharp operating rebound in the quarter, but the quality of that rebound deserves a closer read. Operating income was $904 million, or about 25.2% of net revenues, compared with $609 million, or about 21.3%, a year earlier. Net income attributable to Las Vegas Sands Corp. was $567 million versus $352 million. The longer view is also useful. Annual revenues were $13.02 billion for 2025 versus $11.3 billion for 2024, and operating income was $2.82 billion versus $2.4 billion. The company reported $13.74 billion of revenue in 2019 and an operating loss of $1.69 billion in 2020 when revenue fell to $3.61 billion, so the current recovery is measured against a sharply disrupted base. Cash generation looks firmer than a year ago, with operating cash flow of $731 million versus $526 million and capital expenditures down to $194 million from $379 million. However, the company returned more cash than it generated from operations in the quarter: $753 million of share repurchases and $202 million of dividends totaled $955 million. Net debt repayment was modest, with $797 million of new debt proceeds against $830 million of repayments, and cash declined by $511 million. The cash flow statement also shows $137 million of leasehold interests in land payments within operating activities. Macao concession obligations are a long-dated commitment. The concession expires December 31, 2032, and VML has committed to invest at least 35.84 billion patacas (about $4.44 billion at March 31, 2026 rates), of which 33.39 billion patacas must go to non-gaming projects. The 2025 spend of about 2.52 billion patacas (about $313 million) remains subject to an audit still in progress. The Singapore Second Supplemental Agreement, under which MBS assumed liability for land premium on additional gaming and ancillary area, is another commitment readers may want to look at in Note 9. No forensic scores are on file for this company, so this analysis does not rely on any score. The risk-factor excerpt provided is mostly table-of-contents text, so readers may want to review the full Item 1A and the commitments note directly.
Catalyst.Revenue growth in the first quarter of 2026 is coming mainly from casino floors. Net revenues were $3,585 million versus $2,862 million a year earlier, up 25.3%, with casino revenue up 28.8% to $2,739 million. Management attributes the Macao increase of $399 million and the Marina Bay Sands increase of $324 million to higher table game and slot volumes and, in Macao, a higher Rolling Chip win percentage. Rolling Chip volume rose 123.8% at Marina Bay Sands to $17,965 million and 173.5% at The Londoner Macao to $4,683 million. Operating income rose to $904 million from $609 million. The MD&A also credits room revenue gains to the Londoner Grand conversion, completed in April 2025, and the Marina Bay Sands suite renovation, completed in May 2025.
Hidden risk.The growth leans heavily on high-volume Rolling Chip play, and the MD&A itself warns that win percentages can vary considerably over shorter periods. Rolling Chip win at The Parisian Macao fell to 1.11% from 4.25%, and at The Londoner Macao to 3.31% from 3.56%, so higher volume does not guarantee higher casino revenue. Non-Rolling Chip win also declined at several Macao properties. On the balance sheet, current maturities of debt rose to $1,824 million from $1,128 million, cash fell to $3,330 million from $3,841 million, and total equity dropped to $1,608 million from $1,934 million, largely because treasury stock grew to $9,774 million.
What traders are betting.
The metric
Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.
- Shares sold short
- 18.4M
- Change since Aug 31
- +3.6%
- Days to cover
- 3.2
What it tells us
A large group of traders is betting that LVS shares will fall. That is a strong negative view, and also a crowd that would have to buy shares back if the price rises.
Little changed since the Aug 31 report (+3.6%).
At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 3.2 days to buy back every borrowed share.
How investors use it
- Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
- Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
- Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
- Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.
Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement
The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Las Vegas Sands filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.
- Jul 24, 202610-QQuarterly report0EDGAR →
- Jul 22, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0EDGAR →
- May 5, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-05-04)No specific items found in 8-K.0EDGAR →
- Apr 24, 202610-QQuarterly report (2026-03-31)Period: 2026-03-310EDGAR →
- Apr 22, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-04-22)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0EDGAR →
- Apr 1, 2026DEF 14AProxy statement (2026-05-14)0EDGAR →
- Mar 5, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-03-03)No specific items found in 8-K.0EDGAR →
- Feb 6, 202610-KAnnual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310EDGAR →
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