Lockheed Martin Corporation

LMT Industrials · Aerospace & Defense
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$532.64
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$437.25 — $692.00
-23% from high
Market cap
122.9B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
2.7%
P/E
19.6
Trailing
Verdict status · Oct 16, 2026

Not yet scored

Filing.fyi has not computed forensic scores for LMT yet. Scores appear after the company's next data refresh.

No verdict yet
RED DEEP Scores pending shown after the next data refresh
Composite Health
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

The financial data available for Lockheed Martin is limited to eight fiscal years of total revenue, and that is the basis for this verdict. Revenue rose from $53.76 billion in 2018-FY to $75.05 billion in 2025-FY, an increase of roughly 40% over seven years, with the largest single-year gains in 2019-FY (about 11.3%) and 2020-FY (about 9.3%). Growth since then has been more modest: about 2.5% in 2021-FY, a decline of about 1.6% in 2022-FY, about 2.4% in 2023-FY, about 5.1% in 2024-FY, and about 5.6% in 2025-FY. The recent acceleration is consistent with a business expanding its top line, but revenue alone does not show margins, cash generation, backlog, or whether growth came from core operations. No forensic scores are on file, so this synthesis does not assign a value or label to any of them. For orientation only, the Beneish M-Score screens for possible earnings manipulation using changes in receivables, margins, and other accounts. The Piotroski F-Score counts profitability, leverage, and efficiency signals. The Altman Z-Score estimates financial distress risk and is designed for non-financial firms. The Fog Index estimates how hard a filing is to read. Each would need to be computed from the filings and read against its own label before drawing a conclusion, and their absence here is a gap in the record, not a clean result. Readers may want to look at the MD&A for segment-level commentary, the risk-factor section for disclosed contract and government-spending exposures, and the cash flow statement to see whether reported revenue converts to cash. Taken together, the revenue trend supports a description of steady expansion with one down year, but it does not by itself establish the quality of those earnings or the company's risk profile.

Catalyst.The only financial data on file for Lockheed Martin is annual revenue, which rose from $53.76 billion in 2018-FY to $75.05 billion in 2025-FY. The most recent year grew about 5.6% over 2024-FY's $71.04 billion, following growth of about 5.1% in 2024-FY and about 2.4% in 2023-FY. Because no MD&A text is on file, this dataset cannot attribute those results to specific programs, segments, or demand drivers, so the business drivers behind the revenue trend are not described here.

Hidden risk.The most material gap for a careful reader is what is missing: no risk-factor text, MD&A, forensic scores, or news are on file, so this synthesis cannot identify the company's disclosed risks or run manipulation or distress screens. The revenue series also shows growth is not uninterrupted. 2022-FY revenue of $65.98 billion was about 1.6% below 2021-FY's $67.04 billion, a reminder that a multi-year upward trend can hide a down year. Readers may want to look at the risk-factor section of the company's annual filing directly.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what LMT reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
1.4%
of the shares available to trade
Low
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
2.7M
Change since Aug 31
+1.8%
Days to cover
2.3

What it tells us

Few traders are betting against LMT. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.

Little changed since the Aug 31 report (+1.8%).

At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 2.3 days to buy back every borrowed share.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Quarterly report

The quarterly report (10-Q) and current reports (8-K) Lockheed Martin filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Aug 27, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 1.01: Signed a material agreement
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 23, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 23, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report0
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

If this case caught your eye

Affiliate links — Filing.fyi earns a commission on Amazon purchases. We pick the books first, attach the link second.

Financial Shenanigans

Howard M. Schilit

Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.

View on Amazon →

The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

View on Amazon →

Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

View on Amazon →