Lennar Corporation
LEN Consumer Cyclical · Residential ConstructionNot yet scored
Filing.fyi has not computed forensic scores for LEN yet. Scores appear after the company's next data refresh.
What the filing actually says.
The filings show a homebuilder that is growing unit volume while earning less per home and per dollar of revenue. Fiscal 2025 net income was $2.08 billion, compared with $3.93 billion in fiscal 2024, and the fall in net margin from about 11.1% to about 6.1% is worth weighing against the company's description of its focus on strong operating margins. Net income fell faster than revenue, and the drop in average sales price from $423,000 to $391,000 is a concrete reason. Financial Services, Multifamily and Lennar Other are reportable segments, but the data provided gives no segment-level revenue or profit figures, so this analysis cannot say which segment drove the decline. The Rausch Coleman acquisition and the Millrose transactions are both described as shaping the business. The 10-Q repurchase table shows 2,000,000 shares repurchased under the publicly announced program in February 2026, with about $1.45 billion of remaining authorization at February 28, 2026. The filing excerpt does not explain how those repurchases relate to the earnings trend. Forensic scores: no Beneish M-Score, Piotroski F-Score, Altman Z-Score or Fog Index is on file for this company, so no score is cited here and none is implied. Readers may want to look at the segment note in the 10-K, the full Item 1A risk-factor text, and the MD&A discussion of gross margin, none of which were included in the excerpts provided.
Catalyst.Management's MD&A points to homebuilding as the core of the business, which generated $32 billion, about 94% of fiscal 2025 consolidated revenues of $34.19 billion. Deliveries rose to 82,583 homes from 80,210 in fiscal 2024, while the average sales price, excluding unconsolidated entities, fell to $391,000 from $423,000. The company is pursuing a land-light model: 98% of total homesites were controlled through options with land banks, land sellers and joint ventures at November 30, 2025, up from 82% a year earlier. The February 2025 Rausch Coleman Homes acquisition added markets in Arkansas, Oklahoma, Alabama and Kansas/Missouri.
Hidden risk.The clearest tension is between volume and margin. Deliveries grew about 3% while revenue fell about 3.5% and net income fell about 47%, so net margin dropped from about 11.1% in fiscal 2024 to about 6.1% in fiscal 2025. The filing describes adjusting prices as a deliberate tool to keep production and sales paces aligned, and the lower average sales price is consistent with that approach. The Millrose spin-off in February 2025 and the November 2025 exchange offer also reshaped the land asset base. The 10-Q says there are no material changes to risk factors from the 2025 Form 10-K, but the risk-factor text provided is only a table of contents, so specific risks cannot be read from this data.
What traders are betting.
The metric
Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.
- Shares sold short
- 19.1M
- Change since Aug 31
- +5.0%
- Days to cover
- 3.9
What it tells us
A large group of traders is betting that LEN shares will fall. That is a strong negative view, and also a crowd that would have to buy shares back if the price rises.
Little changed since the Aug 31 report (+5.0%).
At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 3.9 days to buy back every borrowed share.
How investors use it
- Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
- Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
- Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
- Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.
Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement
The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Lennar filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.
- Oct 15, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 8.01: Other events0EDGAR →
- Oct 2, 202610-QQuarterly report0EDGAR →
- Sep 16, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0EDGAR →
- Apr 13, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-04-08)No specific items found in 8-K.0EDGAR →
- Apr 9, 202610-QQuarterly report (2026-02-28)Period: 2026-02-280EDGAR →
- Mar 12, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-03-12)No specific items found in 8-K.0EDGAR →
- Feb 26, 2026DEF 14AProxy statement (2026-04-08)0EDGAR →
- Jan 28, 202610-KAnnual report (2025-11-30)Period: 2025-11-300EDGAR →
- Dec 16, 20258-KCurrent report (2025-12-16)No specific items found in 8-K.0EDGAR →
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Financial Shenanigans
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