Kinder Morgan, Inc.
KMI Energy · Oil & Gas MidstreamNot yet scored
Filing.fyi has not computed forensic scores for KMI yet. Scores appear after the company's next data refresh.
What the filing actually says.
The data on file for Kinder Morgan, Inc. is limited to two annual income-statement lines: revenues and operating income for fiscal years 2018 through 2025. It contains no forensic scores, no MD&A text, no risk-factor text, and no classified news headlines, so this synthesis cannot test management's narrative against the filing's own explanations or against any screening result. No Beneish M-Score, Piotroski F-Score, Altman Z-Score, or Fog Index value is reported here because none is in the data. In plain terms, a Beneish M-Score is a statistical screen that looks for patterns in reported figures that sometimes accompany earnings manipulation; an elevated reading is a flag for closer reading, not proof of wrongdoing. A Piotroski F-Score counts a set of financial-health signals; an Altman Z-Score estimates financial distress risk and is designed for non-financial firms; a Fog Index estimates how hard text is to read. None of these can be assessed from the data provided. What the two lines do show is that operating income has been comparatively steady in recent years: $4.07 billion in 2022, $4.26 billion in 2023, $4.38 billion in 2024, and $4.72 billion in 2025. Revenue has been far less steady, peaking at $18.13 billion in 2022 and falling to $13.65 billion in 2023. Readers may want to look at the company's most recent Form 10-K, particularly the MD&A segment discussion and the risk-factor section, to learn what drove the revenue swings and how the operating-income trend is generated. Those answers are in the filing, not in this data set.
Catalyst.The data on file does not include MD&A text, so this synthesis cannot attribute any driver to management. What the reported figures show is that revenues rose from $13.48 billion in 2024 to $15.2 billion in 2025, a change of about 12.8%, while operating income rose from $4.38 billion to $4.72 billion, about 7.8%. Operating margin, calculated as operating income divided by revenues, moved from about 32.5% in 2024 to about 31.1% in 2025, so revenue grew faster than operating income over the year. Explanations for these movements belong in the MD&A section of the filing, which readers may want to look at directly.
Hidden risk.The most notable pattern a casual reader could miss is how the two lines moved apart. Revenues fell about 24.7% from $18.13 billion in 2022 to $13.65 billion in 2023, yet operating income rose from $4.07 billion to $4.26 billion, and operating margin expanded from about 22.4% to about 31.2%. Revenue also dropped to $10.1 billion in 2020, when operating income fell about 68.0% from $4.87 billion in 2019 to $1.56 billion. Without risk-factor text or MD&A, this data cannot explain these swings, and no forensic score is on file to screen the figures for manipulation-risk patterns. Readers may want to check the risk-factor section for what drives that volatility.
What traders are betting.
The metric
Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.
- Shares sold short
- 46.2M
- Change since Aug 31
- −5.0%
- Days to cover
- 3.6
What it tells us
Few traders are betting against KMI. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.
Little changed since the Aug 31 report (−5.0%).
At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 3.6 days to buy back every borrowed share.
How investors use it
- Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
- Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
- Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
- Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.
Quarterly report
The quarterly report (10-Q) and current reports (8-K) Kinder Morgan filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.
- Sep 25, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0EDGAR →
- Sep 3, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0EDGAR →
- Aug 7, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0EDGAR →
- Aug 3, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 8.01: Other events0EDGAR →
- Jul 24, 202610-QQuarterly report0EDGAR →
- Jul 22, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0EDGAR →
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