Kimberly-Clark Corporation
KMB Consumer Defensive · Household & Personal ProductsNot yet scored
Filing.fyi has not computed forensic scores for KMB yet. Scores appear after the company's next data refresh.
What the filing actually says.
This synthesis rests on one data series: annual reported revenues from XBRL company facts for fiscal years 2018 through 2025. The file contains no forensic scores, so this analysis does not report a Beneish M-Score, Piotroski F-Score, Altman Z-Score, or Fog Index, and no value for any of them is given here. The file also contains no MD&A text, no risk-factor text, and no FACT-classified news headlines, so management's own explanation of its results cannot be checked against the numbers. The revenue record shows a top line that was broadly stable and rising for several years before a sharp break. Revenues were $18.45 billion in 2019, $19.14 billion in 2020, $19.44 billion in 2021, $20.18 billion in 2022, and $20.43 billion in 2023. The next two years broke that pattern: $20.06 billion in 2024 and $16.45 billion in 2025. The 2025 figure is a decline of about 18.0% from 2024 and about 19.5% from the 2023 level. Over the full 2018 to 2025 span, revenues are down about 11.0% from the 2018 level of $18.49 billion. A single-year decline of this size usually has a specific cause that appears in the filing, such as a change in reported scope, a sale or deconsolidation of a business, currency effects, or a shift in volumes and prices. This data cannot distinguish among those explanations. Readers may want to look at the 2025 annual report's MD&A and its segment and discontinued-operations notes to see how management attributes the change. Revenue alone cannot show profitability, cash generation, or balance-sheet strength, so this file supports no conclusion about those areas.
Catalyst.The file contains no MD&A text, so this section cannot report management's explanation of what is driving the business. The reported revenue record is the only verifiable signal. Revenues rose from $18.45 billion in 2019 to $20.43 billion in 2023, then eased to $20.06 billion in 2024 and fell to $16.45 billion in 2025. The 2025 result is the largest annual change in the series. Readers may want to look at the 2025 annual report's MD&A to see which factors management cites for the change in revenue.
Hidden risk.The most material item a casual reader could miss is the size of the 2025 revenue decline, about 18.0% from the 2024 figure. The data does not show whether this reflects changes in reporting scope, a sale or deconsolidation of a business, currency effects, or underlying volume and pricing. Because no risk-factor text is on file, this synthesis cannot say which of those risks management has disclosed. Because no forensic scores are on file, there is also no independent screen of the reported figures.
What traders are betting.
The metric
Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.
- Shares sold short
- 53.2M
- Change since Aug 31
- +6.2%
- Days to cover
- 11
What it tells us
A large group of traders is betting that KMB shares will fall. That is a strong negative view, and also a crowd that would have to buy shares back if the price rises.
Little changed since the Aug 31 report (+6.2%).
Short sellers would need about 11 days of normal trading to buy back every borrowed share. That is a very slow exit, so a rush to cover could move the price sharply.
How investors use it
- Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
- Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
- Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
- Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.
Quarterly report
The quarterly report (10-Q) and current reports (8-K) Kimberly-Clark filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.
- Oct 15, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings); Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0EDGAR →
- Oct 13, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 8.01: Other events0EDGAR →
- Oct 1, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directorsEDGAR →★ Curriculum-relevant
- Sep 28, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 8.01: Other events0EDGAR →
- Aug 4, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0EDGAR →
- Aug 4, 202610-QQuarterly report0EDGAR →
If this case caught your eye
Financial Shenanigans
Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.
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