Kimco Realty Corporation

KIM Real Estate · REIT - Retail
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$22.67
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$19.76 — $26.65
-15% from high
Market cap
15.2B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
4.9%
P/E
26.7
Trailing
Verdict status · Oct 16, 2026

Not yet scored

Filing.fyi has not computed forensic scores for KIM yet. Scores appear after the company's next data refresh.

No verdict yet
RED DEEP Scores pending shown after the next data refresh
Composite Health
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

The filings provided for Kimco Realty Corporation contain only annual financial facts, so this synthesis cannot draw on management's own explanation of results, its risk-factor disclosure, or news coverage. No Beneish M-Score, Piotroski F-Score, Altman Z-Score, or Fog Index is on file, so this analysis offers no reading of those screens and makes no claim about manipulation risk, financial strength, or readability. What the numbers show is a revenue line that has climbed in every year since 2020, rising from $1.06 billion to $2.14 billion, with the 2025 level the highest in the eight years provided. Operating income followed a more uneven path: it fell from $582.41 million in 2018 to $332.61 million in 2020, recovered to $770.82 million in 2025, and dipped slightly in 2024. Net income is the line that deserves the closest read. It ranged from $125.98 million in 2022 to $1 billion in 2020, and in 2020, 2021, and 2023 it exceeded operating income, which means items below the operating line contributed meaningfully to reported profit in those years. Because the filings on file do not identify those items, a reader cannot tell from this data whether they were recurring or one-time. For someone learning to read filings, the practical lesson is to compare the operating and net income lines together rather than relying on either alone. Readers may want to look at the income statement reconciliation, the MD&A discussion of results, and the risk factors section of the company's annual filings, which would show what drove the gap between the two profit measures and how management describes its retail property portfolio. Those sections were not part of this data, so no conclusion about them is drawn here.

Catalyst.Based only on the annual financial facts provided, revenue grew from $2.04 billion in 2024 to $2.14 billion in 2025, an increase of about 4.9%. Operating income rose from $629.09 million to $770.82 million over the same period, an increase of about 22.5%, which is faster than revenue growth. That implies the operating margin widened from roughly 30.8% to roughly 36.0% of revenue. Net income rose from $410.79 million in 2024 to $584.74 million in 2025, an increase of about 42%. The MD&A text that would explain which properties, leasing activity, or other drivers produced these results is not on file, so this paragraph describes what changed in the numbers without attributing causes.

Hidden risk.The most material tension in this data is the gap between operating income and net income. In 2025, net income of $584.74 million equaled about 76% of operating income of $770.82 million, while in 2024 it equaled about 65% of $629.09 million. In 2023, net income of $654.27 million exceeded operating income of $638.78 million, and the same pattern appears in 2020 and 2021. Net income also fell from $844.06 million in 2021 to $125.98 million in 2022. The data does not show what drove those swings, so a reader cannot tell how much of reported profit is likely to recur. No risk-factor text is on file to explain them.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what KIM reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
6.3%
of the shares available to trade
Moderate
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
34.7M
Change since Aug 31
+9.4%
Days to cover
5.9

What it tells us

A noticeable minority of traders is betting that KIM shares will fall.

Little changed since the Aug 31 report (+9.4%).

Short sellers would need about 5.9 days of normal trading to buy back every borrowed share. A slow exit like that can make a rush to cover sharper.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Quarterly report

The quarterly report (10-Q) and current report (8-K) Kimco Realty filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Aug 4, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 4, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report0
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

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Financial Shenanigans

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The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

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Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

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