JPMorgan Chase & Co.

JPM Financial Services · Banks - Diversified
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$335.53
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$279.10 — $366.50
-8% from high
Market cap
891B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
2.0%
P/E
14.1
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Oct 16, 2026

Deep value.

JPMorgan's 2025 revenue rose 2.8%, while operating cash flow fell to negative $147.78 billion.

Bullish Beneish: -2.24
RED DEEP 100 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Beneish M Earnings manipulation
-2.24
Clean
−3.0 threshold −1.78 +1.0
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

The filings describe a very large, diversified bank whose headline revenue is growing modestly, while several quality signals need a closer read. Full-year 2025 net income was $57.05 billion, down from $58.47 billion in 2024, a decline of about 2.4%. The 10-Q reports return on common equity of 17% for the first nine months of 2025, versus 19% a year earlier, a common equity Tier 1 ratio of 14.8% at September 30, 2025 versus 15.3% in the prior-year period, and an overhead ratio of 52% versus 51%. Readers may want to check these management-reported metrics against the full MD&A. On the forensic scores, the Beneish M-Score is -2.239. Its label places it below the -1.78 threshold, so it is not in the elevated manipulation-risk zone. That is a screening result indicating the model did not flag the figures for a closer look, not a guarantee the numbers are clean. The Altman Z-Score is 0.34, which the label places in the distress zone. The label also states that Altman Z is not designed for banks or financial firms, so this figure should be treated with caution and not read as a verdict on solvency. The Piotroski F-Score and Fog Index are not on file for this company, so they are not assessed here. Balance sheet data are internally consistent: total assets of $4,424.9 billion less liabilities of $4,062.46 billion gives the reported equity of $362.44 billion at year-end 2025. Still, the operating cash flow result is hard to reconcile with the earnings line, and readers may want to look at how the 10-K glossary defines credit categories such as Alt-A loans and option ARMs alongside the mortgage disclosures. Readers may also want to review how the Visa-related gain in the 2024 base year affects year-over-year comparisons.

Catalyst.Management's MD&A is organized around three reportable segments: Consumer & Community Banking, Commercial & Investment Bank, and Asset & Wealth Management. The excerpt describes Merchant Services, which offers merchants of all sizes payment processing, fraud and risk management, and data and analytics. Reported revenue rose from $177.56 billion in 2024 to $182.45 billion in 2025, a 2.8% increase. Nine-month total net revenue was $136.65 billion in 2025 versus $134.79 billion in 2024, but the 2024 period included a $7.9 billion net gain related to Visa shares, which affects how the comparison should be read.

Hidden risk.The most visible tension is cash flow. Operating cash flow was negative $147.78 billion in 2025, compared with negative $42.01 billion in 2024, and the operating cash flow to net income ratio is -2.59. Per the 10-Q, trading assets rose from $637.78 billion at December 31, 2024 to $952.78 billion at September 30, 2025, so a meaningful part of the cash flow swing may reflect balance sheet growth rather than earnings. Credit costs also rose: the third-quarter 2025 net charge-off rate was 0.76% versus 0.65% a year earlier, and nonperforming assets reached $10.64 billion at September 30, 2025, up from $8.63 billion.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what JPM reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
0.9%
of the shares available to trade
Low
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
24.1M
Change since Aug 31
−9.1%
Days to cover
3.0

What it tells us

Few traders are betting against JPM. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.

Little changed since the Aug 31 report (−9.1%).

At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 3.0 days to buy back every borrowed share.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Annual report, quarterly report & proxy statement

The annual report (10-K), quarterly report (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) JPMorgan Chase & Co. filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Oct 13, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Oct 13, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 6, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 23, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 8.01: Other events0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 23, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 5.03: Charter or bylaw change; fiscal-year change
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 14, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 14, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 14, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-04-14)Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 14, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-04-14)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 6, 2026
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2026-04-06)0
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 23, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-02-23)Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 13, 2026
    10-K
    Annual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

If this case caught your eye

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Financial Shenanigans

Howard M. Schilit

Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.

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The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

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Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

View on Amazon →