Ingersoll Rand Inc.

IR Industrials · Specialty Industrial Machinery
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$77.87
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$68.07 — $100.96
-23% from high
Market cap
30.2B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
0.1%
P/E
32.0
Trailing
Verdict status · Oct 16, 2026

Not yet scored

Filing.fyi has not computed forensic scores for IR yet. Scores appear after the company's next data refresh.

No verdict yet
RED DEEP Scores pending shown after the next data refresh
Composite Health
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

This synthesis is limited by what is on file. No Beneish M-Score, Piotroski F-Score, Altman Z-Score, or Fog Index is available for Ingersoll Rand in the data provided, so this analysis does not interpret any forensic screen and does not treat the absence of a score as either a pass or a fail. These screens are screening tools rather than conclusions, so a full read of the filings is needed before a view is formed. On the reported numbers alone, the revenue series shows steady growth over the three most recent fiscal years in the data: $6.88 billion in 2023, $7.24 billion in 2024, and $7.65 billion in 2025. Over the longer series, revenue was $2.69 billion in 2018, fell to $2.45 billion in 2019, and then rose to $4.91 billion in 2020, a step change the data does not explain. Operating income moved from $85.7 million in 2020 to $565.7 million in 2021, $817.3 million in 2022, $1.16 billion in 2023, and $1.3 billion in 2024 before declining to $1.14 billion in 2025. The 2025 decline is the first drop in operating income in the series since 2020, and it arrives alongside higher revenue, which is the pattern a careful reader would want to explain using the MD&A. Without segment data, product names, debt instruments, or legal matters in the provided text, this analysis cannot name which businesses drove the change. Readers may want to look at the MD&A discussion of segment results, the debt footnotes for interest obligations, and the legal proceedings section for items that could affect future earnings. The absence of risk-factor text also means this synthesis cannot compare management's own risk disclosures against the numbers, which is a core step in the analysis.

Catalyst.The data provided shows a revenue trend rather than the reasons behind it. Revenues rose from $6.88 billion in 2023 to $7.24 billion in 2024 and $7.65 billion in 2025, year-over-year increases of about 5.2% and 5.7%. Operating income reached $1.3 billion in 2024 before falling to $1.14 billion in 2025. No MD&A text is on file, so this synthesis cannot attribute the revenue growth to specific segments, products, pricing, or acquisitions.

Hidden risk.The most visible tension in the data is margin compression. Operating income fell about 12.3% in 2025, from $1.3 billion to $1.14 billion, while revenue grew about 5.7%. Operating margin, calculated as operating income divided by revenue, moved from roughly 18.0% in 2024 to roughly 14.9% in 2025. The data does not explain the cause, and no risk-factor text is on file to show whether management has flagged it. Readers may want to look at the risk factors and MD&A in the full annual report to see what management says about costs and margins.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what IR reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
4.0%
of the shares available to trade
Low
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
13.6M
Change since Aug 31
+2.8%
Days to cover
2.9

What it tells us

Few traders are betting against IR. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.

Little changed since the Aug 31 report (+2.8%).

At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 2.9 days to buy back every borrowed share.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Quarterly report

The quarterly report (10-Q) and current report (8-K) Ingersoll Rand filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Jul 31, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 30, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

If this case caught your eye

Affiliate links — Filing.fyi earns a commission on Amazon purchases. We pick the books first, attach the link second.

Financial Shenanigans

Howard M. Schilit

Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.

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The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

View on Amazon →

Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

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