Invitation Homes Inc.

INVH Real Estate · REIT - Residential
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$26.80
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$24.25 — $30.89
-13% from high
Market cap
15.8B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
4.5%
P/E
24.6
Trailing
Verdict status · Oct 16, 2026

Not yet scored

Filing.fyi has not computed forensic scores for INVH yet. Scores appear after the company's next data refresh.

No verdict yet
RED DEEP Scores pending shown after the next data refresh
Composite Health
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

This synthesis is built only on the annual financial facts supplied, so it cannot cover the MD&A narrative, risk-factor disclosures, named programs, segments, debt instruments, legal matters or news that a full reading of Invitation Homes' filings would include. Within those limits, the reported numbers show revenue rising in every year shown, from $1.76 billion in 2019 to $2.73 billion in 2025, a total increase of roughly 55 percent. The pace has slowed in the latest year, with 2025 revenue about 4.2 percent above 2024. Net income is the less steady line. It recovered from a loss of $4.93 million in 2018 to $587.92 million in 2025, but it moved both ways along the way, including a decline of about 12.6 percent in 2024 after 2023. Total assets were $18.68 billion at the end of 2025, slightly below the $18.7 billion reported for 2024 and below the $19.22 billion at the end of 2023, so the revenue and profit gains have not come with a larger asset base over the last two years. No forensic scores are on file for this company. That means there is no Beneish M-Score, Piotroski F-Score, Altman Z-Score or Fog Index reading in this synthesis, and no score direction is stated. These screens are used to flag possible earnings-quality or disclosure concerns, so their absence is a gap in this review rather than a sign either way. Readers may want to look at the full 10-K, starting with the MD&A and risk factors, and at the cash flow statement, which is not included in this data set, before drawing conclusions about how durable the 2025 profit level is.

Catalyst.The data provided here contains only annual financial facts, so the business drivers that management describes in its MD&A cannot be confirmed from this set. What the numbers show is steady top-line growth: revenues rose from $1.76 billion in 2019 to $2.73 billion in 2025, and the 2025 figure is up from $2.62 billion in 2024, a gain of about 4.2%. Net income reached $587.92 million in 2025, compared with $453.92 million in 2024, an increase of about 29.5%. Readers may want to look at the full MD&A in the 10-K to see which operating factors management credits for these results.

Hidden risk.Net income has not moved in a straight line. It fell from $519.47 million in 2023 to $453.92 million in 2024, a decline of about 12.6%, before rising to $587.92 million in 2025. It was negative at -$4.93 million in 2018. Total assets were $18.68 billion at the end of 2025, below the $19.22 billion reported at the end of 2023. The data provided includes no operating income after 2017, so the current profit level cannot be separated into operating and non-operating pieces here. Because no risk-factor text or forensic scores were available, this synthesis cannot screen for earnings-quality or disclosure concerns.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what INVH reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
4.0%
of the shares available to trade
Low
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
17.2M
Change since Aug 31
+21.9%
Days to cover
3.2

What it tells us

Few traders are betting against INVH. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.

Short sellers added to their bets: shares sold short grew 21.9% since the Aug 31 report.

At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 3.2 days to buy back every borrowed share.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Quarterly report

The quarterly report (10-Q) and current report (8-K) Invitation Homes filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Sep 9, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 30, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report0
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

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Financial Shenanigans

Howard M. Schilit

Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.

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The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

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Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

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