Interactive Brokers Group, Inc.
IBKR Financial Services · Capital MarketsNot yet scored
Filing.fyi has not computed forensic scores for IBKR yet. Scores appear after the company's next data refresh.
What the filing actually says.
This synthesis is limited by what is on file. The data includes only annual revenues and net income for fiscal 2018 through 2025, with no forensic scores, MD&A narrative, risk-factor text, or classified news. No Beneish M-Score, Piotroski F-Score, Altman Z-Score, or Fog Index reading is given here, and none should be inferred from the figures. In plain terms, a Beneish M-Score is a screen that flags possible earnings manipulation for a closer read, a Piotroski F-Score counts a set of financial-health checks, an Altman Z-Score estimates financial distress risk, and a Fog Index estimates how hard a document is to read. Each would need its own source data before it could be interpreted. The reported figures show a long pattern. Net income rose from $1.12 billion in 2018 to $4.36 billion in 2025, while revenues moved less steadily, falling from $925 million in 2018 to $847 million in 2019 before reaching $2.44 billion in 2025. Revenue dipped from $1.57 billion in 2021 to $1.51 billion in 2022, a decline of about 4%, while net income kept climbing. The sharpest divergence sits in 2025, where net income exceeds revenue by about $1.92 billion. A reader cannot resolve that gap from this data alone. The filing's income statement and its notes would show how the company defines revenue and what sits below it, and readers may want to look at those sections directly before drawing conclusions about profitability.
Catalyst.The only filing-derived figures on file are annual revenues and net income. Revenues rose from $1.98 billion in the 2024 fiscal year to $2.44 billion in 2025, a change of about 23%, after $1.56 billion in 2023. Net income increased from $3.41 billion in 2024 to $4.36 billion in 2025, about 28%. Because no MD&A text is on file, this summary cannot say which businesses, products, or market conditions drove those changes.
Hidden risk.The most material caveat is a data-definition question. In 2025, reported net income of $4.36 billion is well above reported revenues of $2.44 billion, which is unusual because revenue is normally the top line of an income statement. That gap suggests the revenue figure may be a narrower line item than total net revenue, or that net income includes items outside operating revenue. Without the income statement context, margin ratios cannot be relied on from this data. Risk-factor text is also not on file, so readers may want to look at the company's risk factors section directly.
What traders are betting.
The metric
Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.
- Shares sold short
- 13.7M
- Change since Aug 31
- +33.2%
- Days to cover
- 3.6
What it tells us
Few traders are betting against IBKR. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.
Short sellers added to their bets: shares sold short grew 33.2% since the Aug 31 report.
At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 3.6 days to buy back every borrowed share.
How investors use it
- Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
- Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
- Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
- Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.
SEC filings
The current reports (8-K) Interactive Brokers Group filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.
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