Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc.
HII Industrials · Aerospace & DefenseNot yet scored
Filing.fyi has not computed forensic scores for HII yet. Scores appear after the company's next data refresh.
What the filing actually says.
The reported numbers show a top line that has grown steadily: revenue rose from $8.18 billion in 2018 to $12.48 billion in 2025. Profit has been less consistent. Operating income was $951 million in 2018, $799 million in 2020 and $781 million in 2023, fell to $535 million in 2024, and recovered to $657 million in 2025. Net income rose to $605 million in 2025 from $550 million in 2024, but it remains below the $681 million reported for 2023, so the 2025 recovery has not returned profit to that level. Management's narrative centers on execution across the Navy shipbuilding portfolio, from Ford class carriers to LPD and LHA amphibious ships and Columbia class modules. The Item 3 market-risk section states that as of March 31, 2026, no indebtedness was outstanding under the $1.7 billion revolving credit facility or the $1.7 billion commercial paper program, so interest-rate exposure from those instruments is currently nil. The same section says cost inflation may exceed the cost assumptions built into contract estimates if inflationary conditions persist. Readers may want to look at how that inflation risk interacts with the remaining shipbuilding backlog as these ships are completed. The risk factors also say the company may not recover costs above existing funding until Congress appropriates more money, so cash timing on large programs depends on budget decisions outside management's control. The Legend class termination shows that a contract can shrink even while total revenue grows. No forensic scores are on file for this review, so this analysis does not state Beneish M-Score, Piotroski F-Score, Altman Z-Score or Fog Index results, and it relies only on reported revenue, operating income, net income, the 10-Q market-risk disclosures and the risk-factor text. Readers may want to check the full filings directly, especially the program and government-funding disclosures, before drawing conclusions.
Catalyst.Revenue reached $12.48 billion in fiscal 2025, up about 8.1% from $11.54 billion in 2024, and operating income rose to $657 million from $535 million, a 22.8% increase. The MD&A program glossary points to the work behind this volume: construction of Bougainville (LHA 8) and Fallujah (LHA 9) under the America class, Harrisburg (LPD 30), Pittsburgh (LPD 31) and Philadelphia (LPD 32) under the San Antonio class, and Columbia class (SSBN 826) modules built as a subcontractor to Electric Boat. The Ford class carrier program, including John F. Kennedy (CVN 79), and Arleigh Burke class destroyers also remain in work, and Ted Stevens (DDG 128) was delivered in 2025.
Hidden risk.The most material tension is government dependence. The risk factors state that substantially all 2025 revenue came from U.S. Government sales, and that the government can terminate contracts for convenience with little or no prior notice, with recovery limited to costs incurred and authorized profit. Program funding also depends on annual appropriations and continuing resolutions, and a federal shutdown occurred in October 2025. Separately, the company agreed in 2025 to end production of the 11th and final Legend class National Security Cutter, so at least one program has already been reduced in scope. Operating margin was about 5.3% in 2025 versus about 6.8% in 2023, so recent growth has not yet restored the earlier profitability level.
What traders are betting.
The metric
Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.
- Shares sold short
- 1.5M
- Change since Aug 31
- +30.7%
- Days to cover
- 3.1
What it tells us
Few traders are betting against HII. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.
Short sellers added to their bets: shares sold short grew 30.7% since the Aug 31 report.
At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 3.1 days to buy back every borrowed share.
How investors use it
- Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
- Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
- Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
- Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.
Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement
The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Huntington Ingalls Industries filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.
- Jul 30, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0EDGAR →
- Jul 30, 202610-QQuarterly report0EDGAR →
- May 5, 202610-QQuarterly report (2026-03-31)Period: 2026-03-310EDGAR →
- May 5, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-05-05)No specific items found in 8-K.0EDGAR →
- May 1, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-04-29)No specific items found in 8-K.0EDGAR →
- Mar 20, 2026DEF 14AProxy statement (2025-12-31)0EDGAR →
- Feb 5, 202610-KAnnual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310EDGAR →
- Feb 5, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-02-05)No specific items found in 8-K.0EDGAR →
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