Genuine Parts Company
GPC Consumer Cyclical · Auto PartsNot yet scored
Filing.fyi has not computed forensic scores for GPC yet. Scores appear after the company's next data refresh.
What the filing actually says.
Taken together, the data supports a narrower conclusion than the headline revenue figure suggests. Revenue grew from $18.74 billion in 2018 to $24.3 billion in 2025, a rise of about 30% over seven years. The 2020 decline to $16.54 billion shows revenue can move sharply within a few years, with recovery to $18.87 billion in 2021 and continued growth after that. Operating income is the other half of the picture, and the file only covers 2014 through 2018. In that window it ranged from $1.23 billion in 2016 to $1.43 billion in 2018, with 2018 the highest in the set. Operating income in 2018 was about 7.6% of revenue, but that ratio cannot be carried forward because no later operating income is provided. On forensic scores, nothing is on file for this company. No Beneish M-Score, Piotroski F-Score, Altman Z-Score, or Fog Index value is given here, so none is reported or interpreted in this synthesis. The Beneish M-Score is a screen that compares several reported ratios year over year to flag possible earnings manipulation. The Piotroski F-Score counts a set of basic profitability, leverage and efficiency tests. The Altman Z-Score estimates financial distress risk, and the Fog Index measures how hard text is to read. These are general descriptions and say nothing about GPC's results. Because MD&A and risk-factor text are also absent, the filing narrative cannot be set against the numbers. Readers may want to look at the company's most recent Form 10-K directly, particularly the MD&A segment discussion, the risk factors section, and the operating income and cash flow statements for 2019 onward, which this data does not include. Those sections would allow a reader to test whether revenue growth has carried through to operating profit and to check the balance sheet. Until that is done, the supported statement is that GPC's reported revenue has grown over the period covered, while the profitability trend after 2018 remains unverified in this data.
Catalyst.The filing text available here does not include MD&A, so the drivers management cites cannot be checked against the numbers. The revenue figures show steady growth: $23.09 billion in 2023, $23.49 billion in 2024 (up about 1.7%), and $24.3 billion in 2025 (up about 3.4%). The 2025 figure is the highest revenue on file. The series also shows a sharp dip, from $19.39 billion in 2019 to $16.54 billion in 2020 (down about 14.7%), followed by a rebound to $18.87 billion in 2021 (up about 14.1%). Without the MD&A, readers cannot tell from this data which segments, products or programs produced those gains.
Hidden risk.The largest gap is profitability. The only operating income figures provided run from 2014 to 2018, peaking at $1.43 billion in 2018, which is about 7.6% of that year's $18.74 billion revenue. Revenue has since risen roughly 30% to $24.3 billion in 2025, yet the file contains no operating income for 2019 through 2025, so a reader cannot confirm whether margins held as sales grew. Because no risk-factor text or forensic scores are on file, there is no independent screen of the balance sheet or cash flow either. A casual reader could take the revenue growth as evidence of earnings strength when the data does not show it.
What traders are betting.
The metric
Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.
- Shares sold short
- 6.6M
- Change since Aug 31
- −11.3%
- Days to cover
- 7.0
What it tells us
A noticeable minority of traders is betting that GPC shares will fall.
Short sellers closed some of their bets: shares sold short fell 11.3% since the Aug 31 report.
Short sellers would need about 7.0 days of normal trading to buy back every borrowed share. A slow exit like that can make a rush to cover sharper.
How investors use it
- Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
- Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
- Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
- Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.
Quarterly report
The quarterly report (10-Q) and current reports (8-K) Genuine Parts Company filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.
- Sep 9, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors; Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)EDGAR →★ Curriculum-relevant
- Aug 11, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 8.01: Other events0EDGAR →
- Jul 21, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0EDGAR →
- Jul 21, 202610-QQuarterly report0EDGAR →
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