Corning Incorporated
GLW Technology · Electronic ComponentsNot yet scored
Filing.fyi has not computed forensic scores for GLW yet. Scores appear after the company's next data refresh.
What the filing actually says.
No forensic scores are on file for Corning, so this synthesis does not assign a Beneish M-Score, Piotroski F-Score, Altman Z-Score or Fog Index reading. Because those scores are absent, nothing should be inferred from this page about manipulation risk, financial strength, or filing readability; those measures would need to come from a separate screen. What the data does show is a revenue series running from $11.3 billion in fiscal 2020 to $15.63 billion in fiscal 2025, a compound annual growth rate of roughly 6.7% over those five years. Over the longer window from fiscal 2018, when revenue was $11.29 billion, growth works out to roughly 4.8% a year. The path has not been steady: revenue peaked at $14.19 billion in 2022, dipped to $12.59 billion in 2023, and rose in each of the last two years. Management's MD&A and risk-factor text, which would explain these movements and name the company's product lines, programs, debt instruments, and legal matters, are not included in this data, so they cannot be discussed here. Readers may want to look at the MD&A and Item 1A risk factors in Corning's most recent Form 10-K, along with the cash flow statement and balance sheet, to test whether revenue growth is matched by operating cash flow and manageable obligations. Those documents are the primary source for the company's own explanation and are worth reading alongside any revenue trend.
Catalyst.The filings provided here contain only annual revenue figures, so this section cannot describe what management says is driving the business, because the MD&A text is not on file. The numbers show revenue of $15.63 billion for fiscal 2025, compared with $13.12 billion in fiscal 2024, a rise of about 19.1%. That followed growth of about 4.2% in 2024 from $12.59 billion in 2023. Readers may want to look at the MD&A section of the 2025 Form 10-K to see which products, segments or markets account for the increase, since those details are outside the data provided.
Hidden risk.The most visible tension in the revenue series is how uneven it has been. Revenue rose to $14.19 billion in 2022, then fell about 11.3% to $12.59 billion in 2023 before recovering. Revenue in 2024 of $13.12 billion was still below the 2021 level of $14.08 billion, so the recent rise is the first year above that mark in this series. Revenue alone cannot show whether growth converted into profit or cash. The data contains no cash flow, balance sheet, or risk-factor text to check that, so any debt or cash-flow pressure cannot be assessed here.
What traders are betting.
The metric
Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.
- Shares sold short
- 16.8M
- Change since Aug 31
- −15.8%
- Days to cover
- 2.0
What it tells us
Few traders are betting against GLW. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.
Short sellers closed some of their bets: shares sold short fell 15.8% since the Aug 31 report.
At normal trading volume, short sellers could buy back every borrowed share in under two days.
How investors use it
- Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
- Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
- Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
- Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.
Quarterly report
The quarterly report (10-Q) and current reports (8-K) Corning filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.
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