Gilead Sciences, Inc.

GILD Healthcare · Drug Manufacturers - General
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$157.37
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$114.02 — $160.51
-2% from high
Market cap
195.1B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
2.1%
P/E
—
Trailing
Verdict status · Oct 16, 2026

Not yet scored

Filing.fyi has not computed forensic scores for GILD yet. Scores appear after the company's next data refresh.

No verdict yet
RED DEEP Scores pending shown after the next data refresh
Composite Health
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · wry-editorial preset

The inaugural forensic reading for Gilead Sciences, Inc. (GILD) is notable for what it lacks: specific filing details and quantitative forensic scores. Without a designated form type, filing date, or report period, the usual anchors for a forensic review are absent. This means the initial scan, which typically identifies immediate red flags or areas of strength, must instead acknowledge a blank slate. The forensic accounting framework, designed to detect potential earnings manipulation or financial distress, relies on specific data points. Their absence here is, paradoxically, the primary observation for this reading.

The quantitative signals, typically derived from a company’s financial statements, are entirely unavailable for Gilead Sciences. Beneish’s M-Score (Beneish, 1999), an eight-ratio earnings-manipulation detector, is not provided, leaving its critical insight into accruals and revenue recognition unaddressed. Similarly, Altman’s Z″ (Altman, 1968), a bankruptcy-distress index, offers no insight into the company’s solvency trajectory. Piotroski’s F-Score (Piotroski, 2000), a 9-point fundamental strength scan, also remains uncalculated, precluding an assessment of operational efficiency and leverage. Even the Fog Index, a readability score where 12 equals newspaper clarity and 18+ suggests obfuscation, is absent. This collective void means the usual quantitative assessment of accounting quality and financial health cannot be performed, leaving significant analytical gaps.

Beyond the quantitative, the qualitative review is similarly constrained. No excerpts from Item 7 (MD&A) are available, a section which typically provides management’s discussion and analysis of financial condition and results of operations. This narrative is crucial for understanding the context behind reported figures, including significant trends, uncertainties, and commitments. Without it, the company’s own interpretation of its performance remains opaque. Likewise, Item 1A (Risk Factors), which outlines potential threats to the business from litigation to market competition, is also absent. The usual process of identifying specific operational or strategic risks, or assessing management’s candor in disclosing them, is entirely precluded, leaving no textual basis for qualitative forensic scrutiny.

This reading, therefore, cannot offer a view on whether GILD the security is mispriced. The usual forensic tools—quantitative scores and qualitative disclosures—are simply not present in the provided data. It can only highlight the limits of analysis when the foundational elements of an SEC filing are unavailable. Without specific financial data, management’s narrative, or a list of identified risks, any assessment of the company’s accounting quality or financial standing would be speculative and unanchored. The exercise here is to demonstrate the forensic framework’s reliance on comprehensive disclosure, rather than to interpret Gilead’s specific situation. The absence of data is, in itself, a data point for the diligent reader.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what GILD reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
1.8%
of the shares available to trade
Low
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
21.8M
Change since Aug 31
−5.1%
Days to cover
3.7

What it tells us

Few traders are betting against GILD. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.

Little changed since the Aug 31 report (−5.1%).

At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 3.7 days to buy back every borrowed share.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

Further reading · curated for this filing

If this case caught your eye

Affiliate links — Filing.fyi earns a commission on Amazon purchases. We pick the books first, attach the link second.

Financial Shenanigans

Howard M. Schilit

Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.

View on Amazon →

The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

View on Amazon →

Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

View on Amazon →