GoDaddy Inc.

GDDY Technology · Software - Infrastructure
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$107.29
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$71.59 — $137.93
-22% from high
Market cap
13.6B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
—
No dividend declared
P/E
16.0
Trailing
Verdict status · Oct 16, 2026

Not yet scored

Filing.fyi has not computed forensic scores for GDDY yet. Scores appear after the company's next data refresh.

No verdict yet
RED DEEP Scores pending shown after the next data refresh
Composite Health
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

This synthesis rests on a narrow set of data: annual revenue, net income, operating income, and total assets for fiscal years 2018 through 2025, with the balance sheet limited to 2024 and 2025. No forensic scores are on file, so this analysis does not report a Beneish M-Score, Piotroski F-Score, Altman Z-Score, or Fog Index. In plain English, the Beneish M-Score is a screening model that estimates the likelihood of earnings manipulation from financial statement ratios; the Piotroski F-Score counts basic financial-health tests, and the count of computable signals depends on the data; the Altman Z-Score estimates financial distress risk and is not designed for banks or financial firms; and the Fog Index estimates how hard a document is to read. Readers may want to check these scores directly on a reputable screening source before drawing conclusions. The longer-term revenue record is consistent: revenues grew from $2.66 billion in 2018 to $4.95 billion in 2025. Net income has been far less steady, including a loss of $495.1 million in 2020 and a peak of $1.37 billion in 2023, followed by declines to $936.9 million in 2024 and $875 million in 2025. Operating margin in 2025 was about 22.8% on $1.13 billion of operating income, while net margin was about 17.7%, down from about 20.5% in 2024. Because the MD&A and risk-factor sections are absent, the company's own explanations for these gaps, its debt structure, and any legal or regulatory matters cannot be assessed from this data. The honest read is that reported operating results are strengthening while the bottom line has softened, and the reason for that divergence sits in filing sections not included here.

Catalyst.The filings supplied here do not include MD&A text, so management's own explanation of what is driving the business is not available for this synthesis. The reported financial facts do show momentum in the top line: revenues rose from $4.25 billion in 2023 to $4.57 billion in 2024 and to $4.95 billion in 2025, growth of about 7.5% and about 8.3% respectively. Operating income grew faster, from $893.5 million in 2024 to $1.13 billion in 2025, a year-over-year increase of about 26.5%. Readers may want to look at the MD&A section of the company's 10-K for the stated causes of these trends.

Hidden risk.The most visible tension is that net income moved in the opposite direction from operating income. Net income fell from $936.9 million in 2024 to $875 million in 2025, a decline of about 6.6%, even though operating income rose about 26.5%. The data does not include the items between those two lines, such as interest, taxes, or other income, so the cause cannot be identified here. Total assets also declined from $8.24 billion to $8.03 billion, about 2.5%. Risk-factor text, debt terms, and cash flow statements are not on file, so a careful reader would need those sections to test this gap.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what GDDY reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
7.0%
of the shares available to trade
Moderate
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
6.5M
Change since Aug 31
+9.3%
Days to cover
2.5

What it tells us

A noticeable minority of traders is betting that GDDY shares will fall.

Little changed since the Aug 31 report (+9.3%).

At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 2.5 days to buy back every borrowed share.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Quarterly report

The quarterly report (10-Q) and current reports (8-K) GoDaddy filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Aug 3, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 1.01: Signed a material agreement; Item 2.03: New debt or other financial obligation
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 30, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 30, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report0
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

If this case caught your eye

Affiliate links — Filing.fyi earns a commission on Amazon purchases. We pick the books first, attach the link second.

Financial Shenanigans

Howard M. Schilit

Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.

View on Amazon →

The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

View on Amazon →

Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

View on Amazon →