Ford Motor Company

F Consumer Cyclical · Auto Manufacturers
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$12.31
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$11.11 — $17.78
-31% from high
Market cap
49.1B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
4.9%
P/E
—
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Oct 16, 2026

Red flags.

Ford swung to a $9.17 billion operating loss in 2025 while equity fell $8.89 billion.

Bearish Altman Z″: 0.38
RED DEEP 0 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Altman Z″ Bankruptcy proximity
0.38
Distress zone
0 threshold 1.10 / 2.60 4.0
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

The filings show a company with $289.16 billion in assets whose 2025 results swung from profit to loss while revenue held roughly flat. The central number is operating income: a $9.17 billion loss in 2025 against $5.22 billion of operating income in 2024. The MD&A stresses a large dealer network, with 8,226 dealerships worldwide at year-end 2025 versus 9,006 a year earlier, and a higher U.S. share, but the excerpts do not tie that narrative to the loss, so readers may want to look at the full Item 7 discussion of Key Trends and Economic Factors. Three forensic and quality measures are on file, and they point in different directions. The Altman Z″-Score is 0.38, which the label places in the distress zone (below 1.10). In plain terms, this is a statistical flag that the balance sheet and earnings profile resemble weakened firms; it is a screening signal, not a prediction of default. The operating cash flow to net income ratio is -2.61. It is negative only because net income is a loss; operating cash flow was a positive $21.28 billion, so the ratio says little about cash strength here, and the excerpts do not explain why an $8.16 billion net loss sits beside $21.28 billion of operating cash flow. Beneish M-Score, Piotroski F-Score, and Fog Index are not on file, so no values are given. Named items in the excerpts, including Ford Credit's 12.5:1 leverage agreement, the $500 million FCE net worth commitment, warranty and recall costs, and exposure to battery metals such as lithium, cobalt, and nickel, all bear on future results. The risk-factor excerpt is truncated before its detail, so readers may want to look at the full Item 1A. Taken together, the filings describe a large manufacturer in margin pressure and balance-sheet strain, with equity down about 19.8% in one year.

Catalyst.Revenue rose 1.2% to $187.27 billion in 2025 from $184.99 billion, but the mix beneath it moved. Total wholesales fell to 4,395 thousand units from 4,470 thousand, with U.S. wholesales down to 2,105 thousand from 2,200 thousand. U.S. sales volume rose to 2,204,124 vehicles from 2,078,832, and U.S. hybrid sales climbed to 228,072 from 187,426 while U.S. electric vehicle sales fell to 84,113 from 97,865. The MD&A says price discounts and incentives have resumed as industry inventories rose, especially with waning policy support for EVs creating excess supply in that segment. Ford's U.S. market share reached 13.2% in 2025 versus 12.6% in 2024.

Hidden risk.The most material tension is the swing from profit to loss. Operating income moved from $5.22 billion in 2024 to a loss of $9.17 billion in 2025, and net income from $5.88 billion to a loss of $8.16 billion. Equity fell from $44.84 billion to $35.95 billion, a decline of about 19.8%, while liabilities rose to $253.18 billion. The Ford Credit section describes a 12.5:1 leverage threshold that could require Ford to make a capital contribution, plus a $500 million net worth commitment to FCE Bank. The filing says neither has been triggered, but a casual reader may miss how closely the captive finance arm is tied to the parent's balance sheet.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what F reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
3.9%
of the shares available to trade
Low
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
132.8M
Change since Aug 31
+34.2%
Days to cover
2.7

What it tells us

Few traders are betting against F. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.

Short sellers added to their bets: shares sold short grew 34.2% since the Aug 31 report.

At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 2.7 days to buy back every borrowed share.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement

The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statements (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Ford Motor Company filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Oct 2, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials); Item 8.01: Other events0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 28, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 28, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 2, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-04-02)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 27, 2026
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2026-05-14)0
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 13, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-03-13)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 11, 2026
    10-K
    Annual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 10, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-02-10)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    EDGAR →
  • Jan 29, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-01-29)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    EDGAR →
  • Jan 6, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-01-06)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    EDGAR →
  • Oct 24, 2025
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2025-09-30)Period: 2025-09-300
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 28, 2025
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2025-05-08)0
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

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Financial Shenanigans

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The Interpretation of Financial Statements

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The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

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Quality of Earnings

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Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

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