Expedia Group, Inc.
EXPE Consumer Cyclical · Travel ServicesNot yet scored
Filing.fyi has not computed forensic scores for EXPE yet. Scores appear after the company's next data refresh.
What the filing actually says.
The filings show a company whose reported profit has recovered strongly from the pandemic. Revenue fell from $12.07 billion in 2019 to $5.2 billion in 2020, and operating income swung from $903 million in 2019 to an operating loss of $2.72 billion in 2020. Revenue then rebuilt to $8.6 billion in 2021, $11.67 billion in 2022, $12.84 billion in 2023, $13.69 billion in 2024, and $14.73 billion in 2025. The 2025 result is the highest revenue figure in the excerpted series, and operating income of $1.87 billion is also the highest in the series. The business mix matters: according to the risk-factor text, merchant bookings account for 70% of revenue, agency for 22%, and advertising, media and other for 8%. The company also reports structural changes, including the sale of Egencia with a 10-year lodging supply agreement with American Express Global Business Travel, and a shift to a unified platform. Those changes are described as efficiency gains, but the excerpt does not quantify their effect on margins. No Beneish M-Score, Piotroski F-Score, Altman Z-Score, or Fog Index is on file for this company, so this synthesis cannot report any forensic screen result. Without those screens, readers may want to look at the audited financial statements, the segment notes, and the full legal proceedings section directly. The filing's own narrative is the primary source for the competitive and marketing risks discussed above.
Catalyst.According to the MD&A, Expedia's current growth is tied to its platform operating model, its unified marketing technology, and its One Key loyalty program, which the company says now includes the majority of Expedia Rewards members. Revenue rose from $13.69 billion in 2024 to $14.73 billion in 2025, a 7.6% increase by simple calculation. Operating income rose from $1.32 billion to $1.87 billion, roughly 42%, lifting operating margin from about 9.6% to about 12.7%. Management also highlights AI integration into products and customer service, and expansion into new markets on Brand Expedia in 2025.
Hidden risk.The risk-factor text says competition is strong and increasing, including generative AI, AI agents, search and social platforms, and travel supplier direct websites that may offer better pricing and loyalty perks. The filing also notes that customer acquisition depends on search engines and metasearch sites, so marketing costs can rise if access or pricing on those channels changes. About 70% of revenue comes from the merchant model, where travelers pay Expedia in advance, but this excerpt gives no balance sheet or cash flow figures. Readers may want to look at the cash flow statement to test whether reported operating income converts into cash.
What traders are betting.
The metric
Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.
- Shares sold short
- 7.9M
- Change since Aug 31
- +52.2%
- Days to cover
- 3.3
What it tells us
A noticeable minority of traders is betting that EXPE shares will fall.
Short sellers added to their bets: shares sold short grew 52.2% since the Aug 31 report.
At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 3.3 days to buy back every borrowed share.
How investors use it
- Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
- Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
- Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
- Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.
Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement
The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Expedia Group filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.
- Aug 5, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings); Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials); Item 8.01: Other events0EDGAR →
- Aug 5, 202610-QQuarterly report0EDGAR →
- May 7, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-05-07)No specific items found in 8-K.0EDGAR →
- Apr 29, 2026DEF 14AProxy statement (2026-06-17)0EDGAR →
- Apr 23, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-04-17)Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0EDGAR →
- Apr 10, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-04-08)No specific items found in 8-K.0EDGAR →
- Feb 13, 202610-KAnnual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310EDGAR →
- Nov 7, 202510-QQuarterly report (2025-09-30)Period: 2025-09-300EDGAR →
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