Expand Energy Corporation

EXE Energy · Oil & Gas E&P
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$90.80
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$83.25 — $126.62
-28% from high
Market cap
21B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
2.5%
P/E
7.8
Trailing
Verdict status · Oct 16, 2026

Not yet scored

Filing.fyi has not computed forensic scores for EXE yet. Scores appear after the company's next data refresh.

No verdict yet
RED DEEP Scores pending shown after the next data refresh
Composite Health
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

The filings show a company that has moved from loss to profit on higher revenue while carrying a large set of forward commitments. The clearest facts are in the 10-Q. As of March 31, 2026, Expand Energy reported $5.7 billion of liquidity, made up of $2.2 billion of cash and $3.5 billion of unused Credit Facility capacity, with no borrowings outstanding. In April 2026 it repaid two 2029 senior notes using cash on hand: the 6.75% notes for approximately $875 million and the 5.875% notes for approximately $446 million, including accrued interest. That is a sizable use of cash, and the company describes its credit as investment grade, rated BBB- by S&P and Fitch and Baa3 by Moody's, all with stable outlooks. Shareholder returns continue alongside debt reduction: the company repurchased $66 million of shares in the quarter, about $84 million more through April 24, 2026, and declared a base quarterly dividend of $0.575 per share on April 28, 2026. The LNG item is a forward commitment, not current revenue. A sales and purchase agreement with Delfin FLNG 1 LLC covers about 1.15 million tonnes of LNG per year at a Henry Hub-linked price, is subject to final investment decision, and targets a 2031 start. It replaces earlier agreements with Delfin and Gunvor Group, which were terminated. Readers may want to compare the $9.2 billion of midstream and pipeline commitments, which the MD&A describes as gross and undiscounted, with the company's cash generation over the coming years. The risk-factor excerpt provided is mostly table-of-contents material, so the discussion of commodity and operational risk relies on the MD&A. No Beneish M-Score, Piotroski F-Score, Altman Z-Score or Fog Index values are on file for this filing, so none are reported here. Readers may want to run those screens directly against the financial statements.

Catalyst.Management describes Expand Energy as the largest independent U.S. natural gas producer by net daily production, operating in the Haynesville, Northeast Appalachia and Southwest Appalachia. Full-year revenue rose to $12.12 billion in 2025 from $4.24 billion in 2024, and net income moved to $1.82 billion from a $714 million loss. The MD&A points to new LNG export capacity, industrial onshoring and data-center demand as expected drivers of tighter gas markets, while mild weather and strong production weighed on near-term prices. Current hedges provide a price floor on over 65% of projected gas volumes through the end of 2026.

Hidden risk.The 2025 rebound follows a weaker stretch. Revenue fell from $8.72 billion in 2023 to $4.24 billion in 2024, and the company reported an operating loss of $803 million that year. The 2020 operating loss of $8.7 billion came during the Chapter 11 period that began June 28, 2020. Liquidity of $5.7 billion at March 31, 2026 is large, but the MD&A also discloses approximately $9.2 billion of gross undiscounted commitments to midstream companies and pipeline carriers. Hedges also limit upside when prices rise. Leadership changed in 2026, with an interim CEO named February 6 and a new CFO appointed April 6. No forensic score data is on file for this filing, so readers may want to look directly at the balance sheet and cash flow statement.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what EXE reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
4.2%
of the shares available to trade
Low
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
9.8M
Change since Aug 31
+16.2%
Days to cover
3.0

What it tells us

Few traders are betting against EXE. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.

Short sellers added to their bets: shares sold short grew 16.2% since the Aug 31 report.

At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 3.0 days to buy back every borrowed share.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Quarterly reports & proxy statement

The quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Expand Energy filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Oct 13, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Oct 6, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 1.01: Signed a material agreement; Item 2.03: New debt or other financial obligation
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Sep 17, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 1.01: Signed a material agreement; Item 2.03: New debt or other financial obligation; Item 8.01: Other events
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Sep 16, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors; Item 8.01: Other events
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Sep 15, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 1.01: Signed a material agreement; Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 30, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 8.01: Other events0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 28, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings); Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 28, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 27, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 28, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-03-31)Period: 2026-03-310
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 28, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-04-28)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings); Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 24, 2026
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2026-06-04)0
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

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Financial Shenanigans

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The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

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Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

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