EOG Resources, Inc.
EOG Energy · Oil & Gas E&PNot yet scored
Filing.fyi has not computed forensic scores for EOG yet. Scores appear after the company's next data refresh.
What the filing actually says.
The data supplied for EOG covers annual revenue, net income and operating income from fiscal 2018 through 2025. It does not include a Beneish M-Score, Piotroski F-Score, Altman Z-Score or Fog Index, so this synthesis reports no forensic score values. The Beneish M-Score is a screen that looks for patterns in reported financials that sometimes accompany earnings manipulation; an elevated reading would be a reason for a closer read, not proof of wrongdoing. The Piotroski F-Score counts a set of profitability, leverage and efficiency checks. The Altman Z-Score is a bankruptcy-risk screen that is not designed for financial firms. The Fog Index estimates how hard a document is to read. None of these is available here, so readers should not infer anything from their absence. The reported figures do show a clear arc: revenue peaked at $25.7 billion in 2022 and operating income peaked at $9.97 billion that same year, and both declined through 2025, when revenue was $22.63 billion and operating income was $6.38 billion. Operating margin, which is operating income divided by revenue, fell from roughly 34.1% in 2024 to 28.2% in 2025. The 2020 operating loss of $544.02 million is a reminder that earnings have been volatile over the period shown. Because the MD&A and risk-factor text are missing, the reasons behind these movements cannot be tied to management's explanations. Readers may want to look at the MD&A, the risk factors, and the financial statement notes in the company's most recent 10-K, along with the balance sheet and cash flow statement, which are not part of the supplied data, to test whether the margin decline reflects commodity pricing, cost changes or other factors.
Catalyst.The filings supplied for this synthesis do not include MD&A text, so this section cannot attribute the business drivers behind EOG's recent results to management's own explanation. What the reported numbers show is fiscal 2025 revenue of $22.63 billion, down about 4.5% from $23.7 billion in 2024, with operating income falling to $6.38 billion from $8.08 billion, a decline of roughly 21.0%. Revenue has also come down from $25.7 billion in 2022. Readers may want to look at the MD&A section of the company's 10-K for management's account of what drove these changes.
Hidden risk.The supplied data contains no risk-factor text, so this section cannot describe the risks the company itself discloses. The most visible tension in the numbers is that profit fell faster than revenue: net income dropped from $6.4 billion in 2024 to $4.98 billion in 2025, about 22.2%, while revenue fell about 4.5%. Net margin compressed from roughly 27.0% to 22.0%. The 2020 fiscal year also shows how sharply earnings can swing, with an operating loss of $544.02 million, before operating income recovered to $6.1 billion in 2021. Readers may want to look at the risk factors in the 10-K to see how management frames these exposures.
What traders are betting.
The metric
Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.
- Shares sold short
- 16.3M
- Change since Aug 31
- +10.3%
- Days to cover
- 4.9
What it tells us
Few traders are betting against EOG. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.
Short sellers added to their bets: shares sold short grew 10.3% since the Aug 31 report.
At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 4.9 days to buy back every borrowed share.
How investors use it
- Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
- Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
- Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
- Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.
Quarterly report
The quarterly report (10-Q) and current reports (8-K) EOG Resources filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.
- Oct 8, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0EDGAR →
- Sep 24, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directorsEDGAR →★ Curriculum-relevant
- Aug 4, 202610-QQuarterly report0EDGAR →
- Aug 4, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings); Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0EDGAR →
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