Ecolab Inc.

ECL Basic Materials · Specialty Chemicals
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$290.81
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$243.15 — $309.27
-6% from high
Market cap
81.5B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
1.0%
P/E
39.0
Trailing
Verdict status · Oct 16, 2026

Not yet scored

Filing.fyi has not computed forensic scores for ECL yet. Scores appear after the company's next data refresh.

No verdict yet
RED DEEP Scores pending shown after the next data refresh
Composite Health
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

On the data provided, Ecolab's filings show revenue that has grown since 2020, reaching $16.08 billion in 2025 against $11.79 billion in 2020 and above the $14.91 billion reported for 2019. The growth has not carried through to operating income in the most recent year. Operating income of $2.74 billion in 2025 is slightly below $2.8 billion in 2024, though it was $1.99 billion in 2023, so the profit line has moved unevenly across the three years for which operating income is on file. The analysis is limited because this synthesis has no MD&A, no risk-factor text, and no FACT-classified news, so it cannot name the segments, product lines, programs, debt instruments, or regulatory matters that management or the 10-K describe. No forensic scores are on file, so none is assessed here. The Beneish M-Score is a screen that estimates the likelihood of earnings manipulation from changes in receivables, margins, asset quality, and similar items, and an elevated reading would call for a closer read rather than prove wrongdoing. The Piotroski F-Score counts a set of profitability, leverage, and efficiency signals. The Altman Z-Score is a bankruptcy-risk screen, and the Fog Index measures how hard a document is to read. None of these has been computed from this data, so this synthesis gives no reading on any of them. Readers may want to start with the consolidated statements of income and cash flows in the most recent 10-K, then the MD&A discussion of operating income, to understand what drove the 2025 change. The risk-factor section would show which exposures management itself identifies. Those sources would help test whether the revenue growth shown here reflects durable demand or whether price and cost effects account for more of it than the headline numbers suggest.

Catalyst.The only company data provided for this synthesis is annual income-statement figures, so the business drivers cannot be confirmed from filing text here. Reported revenues rose from $15.74 billion in 2024 to $16.08 billion in 2025, an increase of about 2.2 percent, after growing from $15.32 billion in 2023 to $15.74 billion in 2024, roughly 2.7 percent. Operating income, by contrast, eased from $2.8 billion in 2024 to $2.74 billion in 2025, a decline of about 2.1 percent. The MD&A that would explain the reasons for these movements is not on file, so no specific product, segment, or market driver is named here.

Hidden risk.The notable tension in the provided numbers is that revenue grew while operating income fell. Operating income was $2.74 billion on $16.08 billion of revenue in 2025, an operating margin of about 17.0 percent, compared with about 17.8 percent in 2024 ($2.8 billion on $15.74 billion). Subtracting operating income from revenue implies operating costs rose from about $12.94 billion to about $13.34 billion, roughly 3.1 percent, faster than the 2.2 percent revenue growth. The data does not show why. Risk-factor text is not on file, so the filing's own description of exposures cannot be checked here. Readers may want to look at the risk-factor section and MD&A in the most recent 10-K to see what management attributes the margin change to.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what ECL reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
2.2%
of the shares available to trade
Low
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
5.4M
Change since Aug 31
+13.4%
Days to cover
4.4

What it tells us

Few traders are betting against ECL. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.

Short sellers added to their bets: shares sold short grew 13.4% since the Aug 31 report.

At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 4.4 days to buy back every borrowed share.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Quarterly report

The quarterly report (10-Q) and current report (8-K) Ecolab filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Aug 6, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 28, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

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Financial Shenanigans

Howard M. Schilit

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The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

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Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

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