DexCom, Inc.
DXCM Healthcare · Medical DevicesNot yet scored
Filing.fyi has not computed forensic scores for DXCM yet. Scores appear after the company's next data refresh.
What the filing actually says.
This synthesis is limited by what is on file. The dataset contains annual revenue for 2018 through 2025 and nothing else: no forensic scores, no MD&A text, no risk-factor text, and no news headlines. Because no Beneish M-Score, Piotroski F-Score, Altman Z-Score, or Fog Index is available, none is reported here, and no reading of those scores is implied. For context, a Beneish M-Score is a screen that looks for patterns in reported figures that sometimes accompany earnings manipulation, a Piotroski F-Score counts a set of profitability, leverage, and efficiency signals, an Altman Z-Score estimates financial distress risk using balance-sheet ratios, and the Fog Index measures how hard text is to read. None of these would be a verdict on the company on its own. The revenue series itself is consistent: each year in the 2018 to 2025 data is higher than the one before, with year-over-year growth rates ranging from about 11.3% to about 43.7%. That is a strong top-line record, but the figures do not show whether margins, cash flow, or debt have kept pace. Readers may want to look at DexCom's most recent annual report on SEC EDGAR, specifically the MD&A section for the drivers of revenue and the risk factors section for disclosed threats, and then check those narrative claims against the income statement and cash flow statement. Until those pieces are reviewed, this analysis can describe the top line but cannot assess the business beyond it.
Catalyst.The only financial data on file is annual revenue, which rose from $4.03 billion in 2024 to $4.66 billion in 2025, an increase of $0.63 billion or about 15.6%. That follows growth of about 11.3% in 2024 and about 24.4% in 2023. Revenue has grown every year in the 2018 to 2025 series, from $1.03 billion. The MD&A text that would explain what is driving these results, such as product lines, pricing, or geographic mix, is not in this dataset, so this synthesis cannot attribute the growth to any specific factor.
Hidden risk.Revenue growth is not the same as profitability, cash generation, or balance-sheet strength, and none of those figures are in this dataset. Growth also slowed from about 43.7% in 2019 to about 11.3% in 2024 before picking up to about 15.6% in 2025, so the trajectory is uneven rather than steady. Risk-factor text is also missing, so the risks management itself discloses cannot be checked against the numbers. A reader relying only on the top-line figure could miss cost, debt, and cash-flow pressures that the full filing would show.
What traders are betting.
The metric
Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.
- Shares sold short
- 14M
- Change since Aug 31
- −20.5%
- Days to cover
- 3.5
What it tells us
Few traders are betting against DXCM. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.
Short sellers closed some of their bets: shares sold short fell 20.5% since the Aug 31 report.
At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 3.5 days to buy back every borrowed share.
How investors use it
- Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
- Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
- Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
- Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.
Quarterly report
The quarterly report (10-Q) and current reports (8-K) DexCom filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.
- Sep 14, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors; Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)EDGAR →★ Curriculum-relevant
- Sep 10, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors; Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)EDGAR →★ Curriculum-relevant
- Jul 30, 202610-QQuarterly report0EDGAR →
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