DexCom, Inc.

DXCM Healthcare · Medical Devices
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$87.71
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$54.11 — $92.59
-5% from high
Market cap
33.1B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
—
No dividend declared
P/E
34.8
Trailing
Verdict status · Oct 16, 2026

Not yet scored

Filing.fyi has not computed forensic scores for DXCM yet. Scores appear after the company's next data refresh.

No verdict yet
RED DEEP Scores pending shown after the next data refresh
Composite Health
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

This synthesis is limited by what is on file. The dataset contains annual revenue for 2018 through 2025 and nothing else: no forensic scores, no MD&A text, no risk-factor text, and no news headlines. Because no Beneish M-Score, Piotroski F-Score, Altman Z-Score, or Fog Index is available, none is reported here, and no reading of those scores is implied. For context, a Beneish M-Score is a screen that looks for patterns in reported figures that sometimes accompany earnings manipulation, a Piotroski F-Score counts a set of profitability, leverage, and efficiency signals, an Altman Z-Score estimates financial distress risk using balance-sheet ratios, and the Fog Index measures how hard text is to read. None of these would be a verdict on the company on its own. The revenue series itself is consistent: each year in the 2018 to 2025 data is higher than the one before, with year-over-year growth rates ranging from about 11.3% to about 43.7%. That is a strong top-line record, but the figures do not show whether margins, cash flow, or debt have kept pace. Readers may want to look at DexCom's most recent annual report on SEC EDGAR, specifically the MD&A section for the drivers of revenue and the risk factors section for disclosed threats, and then check those narrative claims against the income statement and cash flow statement. Until those pieces are reviewed, this analysis can describe the top line but cannot assess the business beyond it.

Catalyst.The only financial data on file is annual revenue, which rose from $4.03 billion in 2024 to $4.66 billion in 2025, an increase of $0.63 billion or about 15.6%. That follows growth of about 11.3% in 2024 and about 24.4% in 2023. Revenue has grown every year in the 2018 to 2025 series, from $1.03 billion. The MD&A text that would explain what is driving these results, such as product lines, pricing, or geographic mix, is not in this dataset, so this synthesis cannot attribute the growth to any specific factor.

Hidden risk.Revenue growth is not the same as profitability, cash generation, or balance-sheet strength, and none of those figures are in this dataset. Growth also slowed from about 43.7% in 2019 to about 11.3% in 2024 before picking up to about 15.6% in 2025, so the trajectory is uneven rather than steady. Risk-factor text is also missing, so the risks management itself discloses cannot be checked against the numbers. A reader relying only on the top-line figure could miss cost, debt, and cash-flow pressures that the full filing would show.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what DXCM reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
4.3%
of the shares available to trade
Low
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
14M
Change since Aug 31
−20.5%
Days to cover
3.5

What it tells us

Few traders are betting against DXCM. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.

Short sellers closed some of their bets: shares sold short fell 20.5% since the Aug 31 report.

At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 3.5 days to buy back every borrowed share.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Quarterly report

The quarterly report (10-Q) and current reports (8-K) DexCom filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Sep 14, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors; Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Sep 10, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors; Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 30, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report0
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

If this case caught your eye

Affiliate links — Filing.fyi earns a commission on Amazon purchases. We pick the books first, attach the link second.

Financial Shenanigans

Howard M. Schilit

Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.

View on Amazon →

The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

View on Amazon →

Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

View on Amazon →