Devon Energy Corporation
DVN Energy · Oil & Gas E&PNot yet scored
Filing.fyi has not computed forensic scores for DVN yet. Scores appear after the company's next data refresh.
What the filing actually says.
This synthesis is limited by what is on file. No Beneish M-Score, Piotroski F-Score, Altman Z-Score, or Fog Index is supplied, so this summary gives no value or zone for any of them. In plain English, the Beneish M-Score is a screen that looks for patterns sometimes associated with earnings manipulation, the Piotroski F-Score counts a set of financial-health signals, the Altman Z-Score estimates financial distress risk, and the Fog Index estimates how hard a document is to read. Their absence means this review cannot use those screens to test the reported earnings. The financial facts that are available show a top line that has recovered from the 2020 downturn, reaching $16.79 billion in 2025 against $4.67 billion in 2020, while profit has moved in the opposite direction over the last two years. Revenue rose about 5.5% in 2025, but net income declined about 8.7%, and the net margin compressed from about 24.8% in 2023 to about 15.7% in 2025. Readers may want to look at the 2025 annual report's MD&A for management's explanation of cost, price, and volume effects, and at the risk factors section for the exposures the company itself names, since neither appears in this dataset. Readers may also want to check the segment and debt disclosures in the full filing, which are not included here. Because no operating income figures exist after 2016 in this data, the company's recent operating profitability cannot be traced from this record. The most defensible reading of the available data is narrow: revenue remains below its 2022 level of $19.83 billion, while earnings have not followed the recovery in sales, and the full filing would need to explain that gap.
Catalyst.The filings supplied here do not include MD&A text, so this summary cannot attribute the business drivers management points to. The reported numbers show total revenues of $16.79 billion for 2025, up from $15.92 billion in 2024, a year-over-year increase of about 5.5%. Revenues had risen about 5.2% in 2024 from $15.14 billion in 2023, after falling about 24% from $19.83 billion in 2022. Readers may want to look at the MD&A section of the 2025 annual report to see what management attributes the revenue change to.
Hidden risk.The most visible tension in the numbers is that revenue grew while net income fell. Net income dropped from $3.75 billion in 2023 to $2.89 billion in 2024 and to $2.64 billion in 2025, and the net margin slipped from about 18.2% in 2024 to about 15.7% in 2025. Earnings have also swung sharply over the longer record, with a net loss of $2.68 billion in 2020 and a net loss of $355 million in 2019. No risk-factor text is on file, so this summary cannot say which exposures management itself flags, and the operating income series in the data ends in 2016, leaving recent operating results unverified here.
What traders are betting.
The metric
Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.
- Shares sold short
- 28.4M
- Change since Aug 31
- +3.5%
- Days to cover
- 2.2
What it tells us
Few traders are betting against DVN. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.
Little changed since the Aug 31 report (+3.5%).
At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 2.2 days to buy back every borrowed share.
How investors use it
- Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
- Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
- Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
- Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.
Quarterly report
The quarterly report (10-Q) and current reports (8-K) Devon Energy filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.
- Oct 8, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials); Item 8.01: Other events0EDGAR →
- Aug 27, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directorsEDGAR →★ Curriculum-relevant
- Aug 20, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directorsEDGAR →★ Curriculum-relevant
- Aug 5, 202610-QQuarterly report0EDGAR →
- Aug 4, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0EDGAR →
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